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ABSTRACT
Motivating Household Energy Conservation
Using Feedback and Social Nudges:
A Field Experiment
February 2016
Elizabeth Hunter, BA, University of Massachusetts Amherst
M.S., University of Massachusetts Amherst
Directed by: Christine Crago
In the context of climate change and heightened concerns about our energy future,
academics and policy makers have taken an interest in the different motivational factors
influencing individuals’ energy-use behavior. One area of particular interest is the role of
information and other non-financial motivators: When traditional financial incentives are
not appropriate or inadequate, are there alternative means we can use to encourage energy
conservation?
Our research looks at the effect of two different types of information programs used
to promote household energy conservation: feedback and social nudges. To do this we
conducted a field experiment at a family housing complex where the cost of electricity
is included in the rent. Sixty-four households participated in the study. After a pre-
treatment period, two-thirds of these households began to receive weekly Home Electricity
Reports [HERs] in the mail with feedback on their electricity use. After four weeks, half
of the households receiving HERs with feedback began to receive additional information
about how their electricity consumption compared to their neighbors. This phase of the
experiment lasted for another five weeks. We then monitored households’ electricity-use to
see if we could detect any changes in energy-use behavior.
Overall we estimated a 1.4 percent reduction in energy-use as a result of the feedback
treatment. This figure increased to a 3.9 percent reduction when the sample was restricted
to households that received low-user status during the pre-treatment period. Low-users
also appeared to react to the social nudge, however, the reaction depended on whether the
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household had received an HER indicating that it consumed above- or below- average the
week before. Time-of-day analysis suggested that the majority of the changes in electricity-
use behavior occurred during evening and night hours.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Household energy conservation has become a key component to energy policy in the
United States. According to the United States Energy Information Administration [EIA],
in 2012 household energy consumption in the United States accounted for roughly 20 percent
of total energy consumption (EIA 2014). Of this figure, 21 percent was estimated to come
from the direct consumption of natural gas, and another 71 percent was estimated to have
come from electricity and electricity losses (EIA 2014). Given that 66 percent of our electric
power comes from a combination of coal, natural gas, and petroleum, we can reasonably
argue that the environmental consequences from excessive household energy consumption
are not insignificant (EIA 2011). In fact, according to EIA (2011), the residential sector
is responsible for approximately 18 percent of total greenhouse gases in the United States,
which are key contributors to climate change. Focusing on household energy conservation
is therefore a logical step in the reduction of total energy consumption in the United States
and lessening our impact on the environment as a whole.
This research builds upon existing literature on incentivizing energy conservation be-
havior in a household setting. Motivating this research is a study conducted by Frankel
and Tai in 2013, which indicated that residential energy consumption could be cut by 20
percent if residents were to make modest changes in their energy-use behavior. Our re-
search seeks to isolate methods that are effective at motivating individuals to adopt such
behaviors. Previous research on the topic focuses predominantly on the implementation of
financial incentives, the improvement of the liquidity on funds for investments in energy ef-
ficiency, or the clarification of the financial pay-offs to the individual for using energy more
conservatively (Houde et al. 2013; Jessoe and Rapson 2014). While these methods are
appealing in their seemingly universal application, Allcott (2011) suggests that price-based
approaches to energy conservation are inept in a number of ways: first, Allcott suggests that
tax-based policies (e.g. the carbon tax) are often not “politically feasible to implement” due
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to fundamental ideological differences over the role of government and government regula-
tion; second, price-based approaches to energy conservation require very specific estimates
of these tax rates (or interest rates corresponding to renewable energy and energy efficiency
incentive programs) in order to be effective, which Allcott points out are currently unknown;
and finally these types of policies may result in a “large drain on increasingly-limited public
funds” if implemented incorrectly. Research into alternative programs that do not rely on
price-based motivators have thus followed (Allcott 2011; Asensio and Delmas 2014; Costa
and Kahn 2010). These programs have the added benefit of potentially being able to expand
their influence to contexts where financial incentives do not traditionally apply (e.g. the
utility-inclusive rental market).
The research presented in this paper seeks to answer the following question: Is infor-
mation effective at promoting energy efficient behavior in a residential setting without the
financial incentive? While a number of existing studies look into information programs in
the context of residents who pay directly for their energy consumption, very few look into
their potential in contexts where residents do not pay directly for their energy consumption.
Thus, a significant portion of the residential sector is excluded. We attempt to address this
deficiency in the literature.
To do this we conducted a field experiment at a family housing complex near the Uni-
versity of Massachusetts Amherst campus where residents paid utility-inclusive rent and
therefore lacked the financial incentive to conserve energy. In the experiment, some resi-
dents received information about their energy-use while others did not. The information was
presented in two different formats: the first format was generic feedback on the household’s
energy-use (i.e. the quantity consumed and an approximation of the financial cost); the
second format incorporated a social nudge (i.e. a social comparison between the residents’
electricity-use and their neighbors’). The information was delivered by mail each week for
a total of nine weeks. We then monitored the residents’ electricity-use to see if any changes
in energy-use behavior on the treated households had occurred.
The preferred model for analyzing the treatment effects was a fixed-effect model with
two binary variables to indicate whether or not the household had received one of the two
treatments. Variations of this model were used to analyze other aspects of the treatments
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such as negative and positive messaging, time-of-day effects, and treatment effect duration.
In summary, our results indicate that information does affect residents’ energy-use behavior.
Upon receiving the feedback on their personal electricity-use, the sample reduced their
electricity use on average by 1.4 percent. The effects were strongest amongst residents who,
prior to the start of treatments, were defined as low-energy users. The social nudge, on the
other hand, led to an increase in energy use. This effect was particularly strong amongst
residents who received information informing them that they consumed less electricity than
their neighbors. Our analysis also revealed that the majority of the energy savings occurred
during night and evening hours and that the impact of the treatments lessened as time
passed.
The importance of this research lies in its real-world application. The rental market
accounts for 34 percent of all occupied housing units in the United States (AHS 2011). Of
this figure, 26 percent of all rental units include the cost of energy in their rent (RECS 2009).
If informing residents of their energy consumption has a significant effect on household
energy use behavior, the implementation of similar programs on a broader scale could
have a positive impact on the environment by reducing total energy consumption and, by
association, greenhouse gas emissions.
This paper proceeds in the following fashion: Chapter 2 gives an overview on the theo-
retical concepts relevant to this study and a survey of similar field experiments; Chapter 3
summarizes the design and objectives of the experiment; Chapter 4 presents a detailed de-
scription of the data, highlights some important energy-use factors, and explores other data
characteristics; Chapter 5 explains the development of and justification for the empirical
used to analyze treatment effects; Chapter 6 presents our results; and Chapter 7 concludes
the paper with a discussion of the weaknesses of the study, its implications, and suggestions
for further research.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
2.1 The Energy Efficiency Gap
The energy efficiency gap, or energy efficiency paradox, are terms frequently used to
describe the disparity between the optimal level of energy-use given current technology1
and what is actually observed. In an article written in 1997, the energy efficiency gap
in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] countries was esti-
mated to be as high as 30 percent of total potential energy savings (Pelenur 2012). To
give this figure contextual meaning, a 30 percent disparity between actual and potential
energy savings would be comparable to driving a car that averaged 35MPG, as opposed a
car that averaged 50MPG despite being financially and functionally comparable. 50MPG
is technically feasible, yet the majority of vehicles on the road have a mileage more similar
to 35MPG. While this 30 percent figure is debatable (Gillingham 2009), there is a general
consensus that, through the adoption of existing energy-saving technology and the modifi-
cation of current consumption behaviors, it should be possible to make significant strides
in improving overall energy efficiency.
Economists often look to failures in the market or behavioral anomalies to explain this
disparity. Theory tells us that the market should naturally come to a welfare-maximizing
equilibrium level of energy-use given perfect market conditions. The most common market
failures discussed in the literature on energy efficiency include imperfect information and
externalities (Pelenur 2012; Allcott 2012; Gillingham 2009). In brief, imperfect information
interferes with an individual’s ability to make an informed decision about his or her energy
consumption habits. Lacking information detailing a car’s mileage, the cost of gasoline, or
efficient driving practices for example, may lead an individual to use the car more excessively
1Often this definition of “optimal” is combined with with the assumption that consumers make net
present value investments (Gillingham 2009). It has also been interpreted as the “cost-minimizing” level of
energy efficiency void of any discussion of the unquantifiable economic costs (Allcott 2012).
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than he or she would otherwise. Additionally externalities - the additional costs and benefits
not accounted for in the market price - can cause distortions in market outcomes. When the
price does not accurately reflect the value of the good - such as the environmental costs or
benefits - the equilibrium quantity is affected as well, and the good may be over- or under-
consumed from a societal stand-point.
The subtleties of time preference and opportunity cost are behavioral anomalies economists
often try to encapsulate in their evaluation of a desired level of energy-use, which their en-
gineering counterparts do not. Perhaps the car-buyer is risk-averse and believes there is a
high probability that he or she will crash the car before the full value of the hybrid invest-
ment comes to fruition. The person making the decision to switch over from driving an
SUV to a hybrid not only takes into consideration the gains he or she will receive from the
reduced gas mileage but also considers the loss incurred from no longer owning a car that
will drive reliably through the snow. Perhaps unaccounted for in the engineer’s evaluation
is the social cost associated with being labeled as a “hybrid driver.” Instead of looking at
the energy efficiency gap in terms of what is achievable, economic analysis looks at what is
desirable given the alternatives.
In essence, the energy efficiency gap consists of three levels: the first level is the level
of energy efficiency currently observed; the second level is the level of energy efficiency the
economist says is desirable; the third level is the level of efficiency the engineer says is
possible. Separating the first and third levels of energy efficiency are many obstacles due
to market failures and other societal tendencies. The level of efficiency that is desirable,
however, is much debated and lies somewhere in between. While it may be futile to assign
numbers to the different levels of energy efficiency, the energy efficiency gap is important to
understand conceptually because it draws attention to society’s potential of making energy
efficiency improvements given the current technology and highlights the multifaceted nature
of the barriers preventing what is from what could be. This becomes exceedingly important
when it comes to policies directly affecting the home.
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2.2 Previous Research on Residential Energy Curtailment
The push for academic research in residential energy efficiency dates back to the Orga-
nization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC] energy crisis and the renewed en-
vironmental concerns in the 1970s when the consequences of excessive energy consumption
were becoming more apparent. Though the technology and culture have changed signifi-
cantly since this time, the high tradeoff costs associated with energy consumption persist.
Today the desire to reduce energy demand has been reignited due to climate change and
heightened concerns about our energy security. Given that the residential sector currently
accounts for 20 percent of total energy use in the United States (EIA 2014) and that recent
research suggest potential significant energy savings through household energy curtailment
(Frankel and Tai 2013), programs targeting this sector are worth exploring.
Existing experiments on energy curtailment in the residential sector have taken various
forms (i.e. in-lab experiments, mail surveys, workshops, interviews, temporary incentive
programs) and dealt with various populations (i.e. homeowners, renters, students, military
families). Despite there being little uniformity, the approaches used in all of these experi-
ments can usually be sorted into three different categories: financial incentives, information
on financial tradeoffs, and information on social tradeoffs.
2.2.1 Financial Incentives
Two of the barriers to energy-efficient behavior include time preference and externalities.
Buying a car with long-term pay-offs is often less appealing if you believe there is a chance
you will crash the car or that fashion trends will soon change; the price of the car also does
not reflect the cost of air pollution nor the benefit of social status. These types of barriers,
which prevent individuals from being as energy-efficient as they could be, can be addressed
in the market through the use of financial incentives. There have been a number of studies
that have looked into their viability in the household setting.
Different studies have looked into different types of financial incentives with varying de-
grees of success. Battalio (1979) measured the response of residents to high- and low-rebates
where rebates were rewarded based on either nominal or relative energy reductions. In this
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experiment another financial incentive to save energy was a bonus to the best performing
households. Battalio (1979) saw a ten to eleven percent reduction in both rebate groups.
Hayes (1977) offered rebates in one treatment group based on the households’ percentage
reductions in energy use. This study saw a 33 percent decline in energy-use in the treatment
that received payments. Suter (2013) provided the participants in his study with a weekly
check for 75 dollars and deducted 50 cents for every centum cubic feet [CCF] of natural
gas consumed above the established baseline consumption rate. This study saw over a 16
percent reduction in energy-use.
Because of a lack of uniformity between the types of financial incentive programs used
in these experiments, it is difficult to determine the most effective method of encouraging
energy conservation using financial incentives. Furthermore since these studies differ in
the samples studied, the technology available at the time, and other societal tendencies –
how can they rightly be compared? When the aim underlying these experiments is to gain
insights into the potential of price-based policies at reducing energy consumption, it is not
surprising that Allcott (2011) expressed hesitation over the government’s ability to discern
the most appropriate policies and execute them efficiently.
2.2.2 Information on Financial Tradeoffs
Sometimes individuals are simply unaware of the existing financial tradeoffs to energy
consumption. This can be detrimental to market efficiency because, in order for the market
to be efficient, all consumers must be fully informed about their options; when consumers
are ill-informed they are unable to act in their own self-interest and the market fails. There
is reason to believe that if individuals were completely familiar with certain behaviors and
investment options regarding energy efficiency and conservation that people would adopt
these behaviors and make these investments because it is in their own financial self-interest.
There is evidence to support the idea that a lack of energy awareness can lead to higher
energy consumption even in the presence of a financial incentive to save energy. A study
done in South Korea by Kang (2012), for example, measured the level of energy awareness
in two apartment buildings to determine residents’ baseline knowledge on the subject and
then provided residents with a basic informational packet with suggestions on how to reduce
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energy consumption. Researchers found that the apartment building that had scored lower
in energy awareness prior to receiving the packet saw significant reductions in energy-
, whereas the apartment building that had scored higher in energy awareness saw only
modest improvements. This experiment supports the assertion that one of the causes of the
energy efficiency gap is a lack of information on how to be energy efficient.
A distinction should be made here between generic information - like the one presented
in Kang (2012) - and feedback. Unlike the dissemination of information that targets a general
audience, feedback tailors the information to actions pertaining to a specific individual. It
is often the case that the individual has a biased understanding of his or her own energy
consumption behavior and may underestimate the impacts of his or her own actions thereby
making feedback more effective. Feedback can be relayed to the consumer in a variety of
formats including regular reports on energy consumption, home-audits, and interactive
displays. Recent studies interested in the effect of electronic in-home displays that provide
households with real-time feedback show that the learning process is a critical part of
getting individuals to reduce their energy consumption behavior. Houde (2014) saw a 5.7
percent drop in average household electricity consumption after installing an in-home display
that gave real-time information on household energy-use. Another study that looked into
consumer knowledge into both energy prices and consumption found that without the in-
home displays, consumers responded minimally to price changes. With only information on
price events, residents reduced their electricity consumption between zero and seven percent.
This contrasts the declines ranging between eight and 22 percent when the information on
price-events was combined with the in-home displays (Jessoe and Rapson 2014).
Simply getting individuals to pay attention to the information available to them has
become an art form. Even within the medium of the written pamphlets what to include
and how to include it results in significantly different responses on the part of the consumer
to the same fundamental message. Brucato (1986) studied the effectiveness of different
pamphlet designs by comparing individuals’ responses towards the same information on
energy efficiency presented in different page lay-outs on the pamphlet. Specifically, Brucato
(1986) found that reordering conservation measures in order of payback years led households
to make more efficient conservation decisions as did switching the first-year energy savings
8
to the left of the audit report.
2.2.3 Information on Social Tradeoffs
Information programs can also target the social tradeoffs to energy consumption. There
is a growing body of literature that explores the role of social nudges in energy-use and
their potential in assisting energy curtailment efforts. This has spawned from the less-than-
satisfactory results of traditional financial incentives and has the added benefit of potentially
being used in situations where financial incentives to save energy do not exist (e.g., in dorm
rooms, the workplace, utility-inclusive housing arrangements, etc.).
The utilization of social nudges to reduce energy consumption is supported by research
indicating that individuals’ energy use is dependent on much more than financial con-
straints. In in-person interviews conducted by Pelenur (2012), individuals were asked to
describe the reasons that prevented them from adopting energy-efficient behaviors or mak-
ing investments in energy-efficiency. Their responses indicated that the most significant
barriers were imbedded in social circumstances, not education or finances. Frequently cited
were the respondents’ beliefs, institutional circumstances, and personal behavior (Pelenur
2012).
One of the areas researchers have explored is the role of publicly praising and sham-
ing individuals for their energy use. Handgraaf (2013) attempted to capture the impact
of public praise in an experiment at an office building in the Netherlands. Researchers
measured energy consumption before and after participants were subjected to one of four
treatments. Some participants received a financial reward for reductions in energy-use,
while other participants received a social reward. Additionally, information regarding each
employee’s energy consumption was transmitted either privately to the individual or pub-
licly to the entire office building2. The results revealed that financial rewards were no more
effective than social rewards, and that public praise resulted in significantly larger reduc-
tions in energy consumption than private praise. The Handgraaf (2013) study is important
because it reveals that public praising or shaming individuals according to their energy use
is potentially a very effective tool in reducing energy consumption. Delmas and Lessem
2In the public treatment it is worth noting that the names of the employees were made public as well.
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(2014) used a similar technique in a dormitory setting at the University of California Los
Angeles. They found that private information, transmitted through an internet dashboard,
was ineffective at reducing energy usage. When this information was made public, however,
using a poster rating the individuals rooms in terms of their level of efficiency, energy con-
sumption decreased by 20 percent. Other studies gauging the effect of publicity on energy
consumption in a dormitory setting include Bekker (2010) and Petersen (2007). While it
can be more difficult to implement public praising and shaming programs on a broader
scale, Seaver and Patterson (1976) found that fuel-oil consumption decreased when good
consumption behavior was paired with a sticker saying “We are saving oil!” to be placed
outside of their house as a form of social commendation. This suggests that even milder
adoptions of these methods can be successful.
Private social comparisons reported on energy bills have gained recent recognition as a
viable policy option. A study conducted by Schultz (2007) found that providing individuals
with a comparison to their neighbor caused household consumption levels to move towards
the mean. When a drawing of either a happy face or a sad face was added to this message,
the result differed in that the below-average consumers of energy did not increase towards
the mean3. This particular study by Schultz (2007) does on a small scale what OPower
does on a large scale. OPower is a private company contracted by utility companies to
promote energy conservation on a much larger scale. They develop and send Home Energy
Reports using neighborhood comparisons along side the monthly energy bill from the utility
company. Several evaluations of this program found that this program was overall successful
and led to decreases in average energy consumption by roughly two percent (Allcott 2011,
Ayres 2009).
An alternative method to social comparisons that is starting to gain traction in the
literature, is pro-social information framing. Like social comparisons, this method has the
potential of being used to promote energy conservation on a larger scale because it does
not rely on public praising or shaming. Asensio and Delmas (2014) conducted a study
on a university family housing complex at the University of California Los Angeles, which
3This study illustrates how sensitive households can be to negative criticism. Following the first treatment
in which these happy and sad faces were circulated, several households withdrew from the study.
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compared the effectiveness of social comparisons among neighbors (like the OPower reports)
to pro-social information framing in the context of public health. They found that framing
energy consumption in the context of health had more persistent effects than did the social
comparison. This suggests that there may be viable methods of promoting energy efficiency
on a larger scale using social nudges other than social contextualization.
2.2.4 Methodological Issues
The strengths and weaknesses of using financial incentives and information programs
to curb energy-use highlight the multifaceted nature of the problem at hand. Obstacles to
energy efficiency and energy conservation are embedded in both the market and societal
norms, which dictate overall energy consumption behavior. There may not be one perfect
solution to breaching the energy efficiency gap, but the existing literature has shown that the
problem can be mitigated if policy addressed these issues from many angles. The literature
has also brought to light a number of methodological issues that still need to be overcome.
The emphasis on economic incentives is not impervious to criticism. In the small-scale
experimental studies, for example, the long term effects of these economic incentives have
not been very encouraging. In several studies the initial reduction in energy consumption
that resulted from the implementation of economic incentives dissipated shortly after the
incentives disappeared (Battalio 1979, Handgraaf 2013). Some researchers have reasoned
that a part of this may be because economic incentives confuse the underlying motivation
behind energy conservation (Handgraaf 2013). If financial incentives are emphasized over
environmental benefits, for example, not only does this reinforce the idea that energy con-
servation is only worth acting upon when there is a financial motivation, but the consumer
could switch to a substitute that is less-than-ideal; for example, switching from natural gas
heating when natural gas conservation is incentivized to electric space heaters. Another
possibility is that investments in energy efficiency will cause individuals to relax certain
energy-efficient behaviors, such as turning down the heat, because the marginal cost of
consuming energy has decreased. This is referred to as the rebound effect.
The potential of energy awareness policies aimed at helping individuals make more in-
formed decisions about their energy use is limited; once individuals become fully informed
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on how to save energy, the information programs will no longer result in higher energy
reductions. In the study done by Kang (2012) measuring the effect of educational pam-
phlets on reducing energy consumption in two different apartment buildings, it appeared
that the initial level of energy awareness displayed by residents was foretelling of the pam-
phlets’ overall impact. The apartment building that had previously scored lower in energy
awareness saw significant reductions in energy use after receiving the pamphlets, while the
apartment building that scored higher in energy awareness did not. One conclusion that can
be reached from this experiment is that educating individuals on energy efficient behavior is
effective at reducing energy consumption, but only to a certain extent. After a threshold is
met, the benefits to the individual for adopting more extreme practices to conserve energy
are outweighed by the costs, and it simply becomes irrational from the perspective of the
individual to reduce their energy consumption further.
Information on the financial tradeoffs can also have a demotivating effect on individuals
if they discover that it is not actually in their best interest. For example, after an educational
seminar series in which residents were invited to take part in a discussion on the investment
decisions of their local utility company in energy efficiency and renewable energy, the number
of people willing to pay really high premiums decreased (Zarnikau 2003). It was suggested
that this may be due to the lack of motivation when these individuals willing to pay high
premiums realized they would not have a large impact on society overall. The lesson to be
learned from this is that, for information to be successful at reducing energy consumption
and encouraging investment, it must be rational on the part of the individual.
There is also some evidence to suggest that promoting energy efficiency using a social
nudge to highlight a social tradeoff to energy consumption can have the opposite effect
on energy consumption than intended. This is known as the boomerang effect. Often this
term is used to describe the event during which the consumer of energy increases his or her
energy consumption when he or she is presented with a social nudge. This has been seen
in a number of studies evaluating social contextualization programs (Costa 2010, Schultz
2007). There are a few reasons to explain this. One explanation applies solely to below-
average consumers. If the consumer discovers that he or she is a below-average consumer of
energy, he or she may relax some of the energy-efficient behaviors with the justification that
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it is normal. Another possibility is that households are “making a Bayesian inference that
they are missing out on valuable consumption opportunities” (Ayres 2012). Alternatively
it may be that the social nudge had a rebellious effect on the consumer. Some may actually
view being an above-average consumer of energy to be desirable because of the individuals’
identity (e.g., political affiliation). Out of spite for liberal propaganda, the resident may be
inclined to do the opposite.
2.3 The Problem of Split-Incentives
One sector that has been largely ignored in the experimental literature is the utility-
inclusive rental market. This is the scenario in which residents pay a flat rate each month
for their energy-use regardless of how much energy they used. To understand why this is a
particularly difficult undertaking for a researcher, first the problem of split-incentives must
be understood.
Households under rental agreements require a different set of policy options because it
is associated with a different type of market failure than owner occupied arrangements: the
principle-agent issue. This problem arises when one agent makes a decision for which the
other agent pays. In the literature on energy efficiency and conservation, this problem is
known as the problem of split incentives. In theory, if a tenant pays utility-included rent,
the landlord has an incentive to invest in energy efficiency because the tenant frequently
uses energy superfluously due to its zero marginal cost. On the other hand, if rent is not
utility-included, thus requiring the tenant to monitor his or her energy consumption, the
landlord resists investing in energy efficiency. Both situations theoretically result in a loss
in efficiency that is not easily remedied by the market4. This contrasts with the situation in
which the owner occupies his or her own house and makes both decisions regarding energy
consumption and investment and pays for the cost directly.
There have been studies aimed at affirming the validity and measuring the magnitude of
this particular inefficiency. Survey results in a study on energy efficiency barriers conducted
4Burfurd (2012) highlights that efficiency can be improved through the market by making available
information regarding the level of energy efficiency of the rental unit, which can help to match high energy
users with energy efficient apartments and vice versa.
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by Pelenur (2012) reported that tenants frequently cited landlords and housing associations
as impediments to investment in energy-efficient appliances, supporting the notion that
landlords are typically thought of as being responsible for investments in energy efficient
infrastructure. Carliner (2013) and Davis (2010) both found that the probability of having
energy efficient appliances was between seven and twelve percent higher in utility-inclusive
rental agreements.
On the energy demand side, there is compelling evidence that residents are more relaxed
with their energy use when not burdened with the financial responsibility of paying for it.
Levinson (2004) found that tenants living in utility-included apartments set their thermostat
between one and three degrees warmer during winter months. This finding was reinforced
by a study produced by Maruejols in 2011, which reported a one-degree temperature change
on average during the day. Munley (1990) found that residents who did not pay for their
energy as part of their rent consumed 32 percent more electricity on average than residents
in the same apartment complex who paid for their energy use separately. Overcoming the
problem, however, is a different issue, as rental contracts of both natures are not likely to
disappear.
There are several potential policy solutions discussed in the literature, which address
the split incentive problem. First, policy makers could simply determine which trade-off
is worse - investment in energy efficiency or conscious energy usage. Gillingham (2012)
speculated that reductions in emissions resulting from energy efficiency investment were
greater than the reductions in emissions resulting from energy-use behavior; this would
suggest policies that emphasize energy-efficiency investment over efforts to curb energy-
use behavior. Second, policy-makers could enforce more stringent efficiency standards for
rental units. Aroonruengsawat et al (2012) found that states that adopted building codes
decreased energy consumption by 0.3 to five percent on average. Finally, policy makers
could implement information programs targeting both landlords and tenants. In this paper
we look at the effect of information programs in the utility-inclusive context.
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2.4 Motivation for Research
By addressing the problem of split incentives in the utility-inclusive housing market, our
field experiment fills a very prominent gap in the literature. Very few studies have looked
into methods of reducing household energy consumption that have not involved some degree
of financial incentives. The study performed by Suter (2013) at Oberlin College, for example,
looked into adding a financial incentive to residents in this sector by paying individuals not
to over-consume. Nevertheless, the growing body of literature on the use of social nudges
suggests that non-financial motivators can be effective at encouraging energy conservation.
If non-financial motivators can be effective at reducing energy consumption in the utility-
exclusive market - as has been shown in the evaluation of OPower reports, among other
studies - then perhaps it be the case that they can be used in the utility-inclusive rental
market.
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CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Our objectives in conducting this research were the following: (1) Measure the effect
of feedback on electricity consumption; and (2) measure the effect of a social nudge on
electricity consumption. Previous research has almost exclusively looked at the effect of
feedback and social nudges in contexts where residents pay directly for their energy-use. By
looking at their effects in the utility-inclusive rental market, not only would we be filling-
in a very prominent gap in the literature, but we would also be able to discern whether
the reductions in energy use seen in previous experiments were primarily the result of the
content, which appealed to their moral sentiment, or to the fact that they were just paying
more attention to their electricity consumption than before.
3.1 Organization of Treatments
To achieve our objectives we designed and implemented a field experiment at the North
Village Apartment [NVA] complex, located in Amherst Massachusetts, where rent was
utility-inclusive and residents did not have access to their electricity consumption data.
Residents in the study were divided into three experimental groups: a control group, Treat-
ment Group 1, and Treatment Group 2. Electricity consumption data was then monitored
over the course of 22 weeks as the two treatment groups were given information on their
electricity-use. During the pre-treatment period, residents received no information on their
electricity usage; during Phase 1 of the experiment both treatment groups began receiving
weekly home electricity reports [HERs] by mail containing feedback on their electricity con-
sumption; and finally during Phase 2 of the experiment, Treatment Group 2 additionally
began receiving the social nudge, which compared each household’s electricity usage to their
neighbors. The organization of the treatments and phases is outlined in Table 3.1:
The justification for this treatment organization is as follows:
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Table 3.1: Experimental Design
Pre-Treatment Period
11/11/14-02/11/15
(13 weeks)
Phase 1
02/12/15-03/11/15
(4 weeks)
Phase 2
03/12/15-04/15/15
(5 weeks)
Control Group No Intervention No Intervention No Intervention
Treat Group 1 No Intervention Feedback on Electricity Use Feedback on Electricity Use
Treat Group 2 No Intervention Feedback on Electricity Use
Feedback on Electricity Use
& Social Nudge
Pre-Treatment Period: Information collected during the Pre-Treatment Period is impor-
tant in understanding households’ electricity consumption behavior more generally so
that we may devise an appropriate empirical model. It also provides us with a good
baseline with which to make comparisons.
Phase 1: During the first phase of the experiment, residents in the two treatment groups
receive feedback on their electricity consumption through weekly HERs. These HERs
conveyed the type of information one would expect to find in an electricity bill, such
as information on total consumption and pricing (see Figure 3.1a). Not only does
this phase allow us to measure the effect of feedback on electricity-use, but without
this phase we would not be able to determine whether the household response to the
social nudge treatment was the result of the social nudge or of being provided with
information on their electricity use more broadly.
Phase 2: During this phase, both treatment groups continue to receive the same feedback
on their electricity use they did during Phase 1, however now Treatment Group 2
receives an additional social nudge presented in a blue box at the top of the HER (see
Figure 3.1b). By doing this we make the assumption that the feedback and the social
nudge treatments are additive, so that we can distinguish between the two treatment
effects.
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Figure 3.1: Home Electricity Reports [HERs]
(a) Feedback (b) Feedback and Social Nudge
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3.2 Experimental Setting
Sixty-four one-bedroom households participated in this experiment (see Appendix B).
These households were drawn from the North Village Apartments [NVA], a family hous-
ing complex for students, faculty, and staff affiliated with the University of Massachusetts
Amherst. Figure 3.2 is a map of the NVA community. There are 237 one- and two- bed-
room housing units in the complex1. One-bedrooms apartments are 371 square feet in area;
two-bedroom apartments are 505 square feet in area. One-bedroom apartments are divided
into housing blocks of six; two-bedroom apartments are divided into housing blocks of four.
Rent is between $760 and $880 per month depending on the apartment size and the resi-
dent’s affiliation with the university. Furthermore the heating and hot water are electric,
meaning total electricity consumption can be equated with total energy consumption.
Figure 3.2: Map of North Village Apartments [NVA]
The most important characteristic of the NVA community with regards to the experi-
ment is he fact that the cost of energy is included in the rent. This is what distinguishes
our experiment from existing experiments on motivating energy conservation in a household
setting.
1To maintain some level of homogeneity, only one-bedroom apartments were eligible to participate in the
experiment.
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3.3 Hypotheses
Going into the experiment, our initial hypotheses were: (1) that the feedback and social
nudge treatments would both decrease electricity consumption; and (2) that the social nudge
would result in greater reductions in electricity consumption than feedback alone. If our
hypotheses were found to be true, this research would support the existing literature on
feedback and social nudges, only in the context of the utility-inclusive rental market. If
either of our hypotheses were found to be false, however, one could infer that the decreases
in energy consumption found in the previous literature amongst rate-payers was motivated
by financial motives, not feedback or social nudges.
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CHAPTER 4
SUMMARY OF DATA SET
4.1 Summary Statistics
In total 225,871 hourly electricity observations, measured in kilo-Watt hours [kWh],
were collected from the 64 apartment units participating in the experiment using the eGauge
meters (see Appendix A). Electricity meters in the North Village Apartment [NVA] complex
started recording data on November 11, 2014. The observations used in the experiment were
collected up until March 15, 2015 - a week after the last round of Home Electricity Reports
[HERs] were distributed. Table 4.1 breaks down the summary statistics according to the
experimental period (pre-treatment period, Phase 1, and Phase 2) and experimental group.
We can also look at the aggregate summary statistics at the hourly, daily, and weekly level
(see Table 4.2).
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Table 4.1: Hourly Electricity Consumption (kWh/hour)
by Experimental Group and Experimental Period
Pre-Treatment Phase 1 Phase 2 Total Obs
11/11/14-02/11/15 02/12/15-03/11/15 03/12/15-04/15/15 11/11/2014-04/15/15
HH (13 weeks) (4 weeks) (5 weeks) (approx 18 weeks)
Control 21 Mean 2.590 2.905 2.052 2.529
(SD) (1.479) (1.385) (1.319) (1.454)
n 42991 13419 17640 74050
Treat 1 21 Mean 2.345 2.682 1.931 2.308
(SD) (1.186) (1.21) (1.175) (1.213)
n 41913 13755 17640 73308
Treat 2 22 Mean 2.255 2.711 1.915 2.259
(SD) (1.087) (1.134) (1.091) (1.126)
n 45607 14426 18480 78513
ALL 64 Mean 2.394 2.764 1.965 2.36
(SD) (1.267) (1.248) (1.199) (1.274)
n 130511 41600 53760 225871
HH refers to the number of households assigned to each group at the start of the experiment. Changes in vacancy status were taken into consideration.
Number of observations vary by household (see Appendix A).
Table 4.2: Hourly/Daily/Weekly Electricity Consumption
HH n Mean SD Min Max
kWh/hour 64 225871 2.360 1.274 0.0003 10.575
kWh/day 64 9416 56.617 20.933 0.262 177.556
kWh/week 64 1381 384.431 144.967 30.934 1180.865
HH refers to the number of households. Changes in vacancy status were taken into consideration.
Number of observations vary by household (see Appendix A).
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4.2 Identification of Outliers
The first task in sorting through the data was to eliminate households experiencing
abnormal electricity use. This was motivated in part by the fact that there seem to be
extreme differences between minimum and maximum observations (see Table 4.2). When
we look at the distribution of average hourly electricity usage for each household throughout
the duration of the experiment (see Figure 4.1), two households in particular stand out for
their unusually high electricity consumption levels. These households consumed two or
more standard deviations above the mean average hourly consumption for all participating
households, and were therefore removed from the sample.
Figure 4.1: Average Hourly Electricity Consumption per Household
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Removing the two outlying households reduced the mean consumption levels and stan-
dard deviation of those experimental groups affected (see Table 4.3). The distribution of
households amongst the experimental groups also changes. The control group and Treat-
ment Group 1 lose one household, bringing the number of households in these experimental
groups down to 20 each. There is no change to the number of households in Treatment
Group 2. All-in-all, by removing the two households from the analysis, we reduce the to-
tal number of hourly consumption observations used in the analysis overall by 7,484, daily
observations by 312, and weekly observations by 46 (see Table 4.4).
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Table 4.3: Hourly Electricity Consumption (kWh/hour), outliers removed
by Experimental Group and Experimental Period
Pre-Treatment Phase 1 Phase 2 Total Obs
11/11/14-02/11/15 02/12/15-03/11/15 03/12/15-04/15/15 11/11/2014-04/15/15
HH (13 weeks) (4 weeks) (5 weeks) (approx 18 weeks)
Control 20 Mean 2.387 2.739 1.908 2.336
(SD) (1.211) (1.200) (1.161) (1.228)
n 40760 12748 16800 70308
Treat 1 20 Mean 2.266 2.594 1.898 2.239
(SD) (1.110) (1.122) (1.163) (1.148)
n 39682 13084 16800 69566
Treat 2 22 Mean 2.255 2.711 1.915 2.259
(SD) (1.087) (1.134) (1.091) (1.126)
n 45607 14426 18480 78513
ALL 62 Mean 2.301 2.682 1.907 2.277
(SD) ( 1.137) (1.153) (1.137) (1.168)
n 126049 40258 52080 218387
HH refers to the number of households assigned to each group at the start of the experiment. Changes in vacancy status were taken into consideration.
Number of observations vary by household (see Appendix A).
Table 4.4: Hourly/Daily/Weekly Electricity Consumption, outliers removed
HH (ΔHH) n (Δn) Mean SD Min Max
kWh/hour 62 2 218387 7484 2.277 1.168 0.0003 10.575
kWh/day 62 2 9104 312 54.627 17.097 0.262 118.028
kWh/week 62 2 1335 46 370.878 118.362 30.934 694.718
HH refers to the number of households. Changes in vacancy status were taken into consideration.
Number of observations vary by household (see Appendix A).
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4.3 Natural Log Transformation
Performing a natural log transformation was also something we found generally appeal-
ing going forward in our analysis. Transforming electricity data using natural logs generally
has two benefits: First, it can normalize skewed data; second, coefficients can be inter-
preted as percentage changes, which makes estimation results easy to interpret. The two
box-plots in Figure 4.2 show how the distribution of average hourly electricity consumption
changes when the observations are transformed using natural logs. In this particular situa-
tion it is not apparent that the transformation improves the distribution of the observations.
Figure 4.2: Comparison of Average kWh/hour and ln(kWh)/hour Distribution
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Outliers removed.
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A formal comparison of distribution is provided in Table 4.5. Table 4.5 compares
the variance, kurtosis, and skeweness of the un-transformed observations measured in
kWh/hour, and the transformed observations measured in ln(kWh)/hour. Variance de-
creases once the observations are transformed, however, there is no improvement in the
skew. The measure of kurtosis also signals that the distribution is less normal after the
transformation. Despite the drawbacks, however, we generally prefer to use the transformed
data over the un-transformed data for interpretive purposes.
Table 4.5: Distribution
n Variance Skewness Kurtosis
kWh/hour 62 0.146 0.092 2.808
ln(kWh)/hour 62 0.044 -0.661 3.574
Outliers removed.
4.4 Important Determinants of Electricity Use
Figure 4.3 plots average daily electricity consumption according to each experimental
group. For the most part we see that the three groups follow roughly the same pattern
over time. Weekly seasonality is visible in the data, as is the the decrease in electricity
consumption that occurred over Winter Break (December 14, 2014 through January 19,
2015) and Spring Break (March 14, 2015 through March 22, 2015). It is clear that the
trend of the data is determined in large part by temperature changes. If we look at Figure
4.4, which tracks average daily consumption and average daily temperature over time, we
can see that electricity consumption is at its highest during the cold winter months and
then drops as temperature rises. This is because it takes more energy to heat a house to 70
degrees during the winter than it does during the summer.
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Figure 4.3: Average Daily Electricity Consumption, by Experimental Group
Figure 4.4: Average Daily Electricity Consumption and Temperature
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We can furthermore assess the effects of other variables on electricity consumption by
regressing variables we know to be important determinants of electricity consumption on
the natural log of hourly electricity consumption. Equation 4.1 is an ordinary least squares
[OLS] regression model where lnkWhit is the natural log of hourly electricity consumption
measured in kWh,
∑
βrXit is a series of variables we speculate are important determinants
of electricity consumption, and εit is the random disturbance. The variables included in∑
βrXit are household attributes, weather indicators, time-of-day fixed-effects, day-of-week
fixed-effects, holiday fixed-effects, and snow day fixed-effects (see Table 4.6).
lnkWhit =
∑
βrXit + εit (4.1)
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Table 4.6: Standard Control Variables (Xit)
Variable Group Variable Variable Name Description
Household Attributes (HH Attr): Housing Block End Unit endi Equal to one if apartment is located on either end of the housing block.
Omitted: Block 1 (Block 1i) Block 2 Block 2i Equal to one if apartment is located in housing block 2.
Block 3 Block 3i Equal to one if apartment is located in housing block 3.
Block 4 Block 4i Equal to one if apartment is located in housing block 4.
Block 5 Block 5i Equal to one if apartment is located in housing block 5.
Block 6 Block 6i Equal to one if apartment is located in housing block 6.
Block 7 Block 7i Equal to one if apartment is located in housing block 7.
Block 8 Block 8 Equal to one if apartment is located in housing block 8.
Block 9 Block 9i Equal to one if apartment is located in housing block 9.
Block 10 Block 10i Equal to one if apartment is located in housing block 10.
Block 11 Block 11i Equal to one if apartment is located in housing block 11.
Block 12 Block 12i Equal to one if apartment is located in housing block 12.
Block 13 Block 13i Equal to one if apartment is located in housing block 13.
Block 14 Block 14i Equal to one if apartment is located in housing block 14.
Block 15 Block 15i Equal to one if apartment is located in housing block 15.
Block 16 Block 16i Equal to one if apartment is located in housing block 16.
Block 17 Block 17i Equal to one if apartment is located in housing block 17.
Block 18 Block 18i Equal to one if apartment is located in housing block 18.
Block 19 Block 19i Equal to one if apartment is located in housing block 19.
Block 20 Block 20i Equal to one if apartment is located in housing block 20.
Weather: Mean Temperature tempt The daily average temperature measured in degrees Fahrenheight
Rain precipt Equal to one if the precipitation for that day exceeded zero inches.
Time-of-Day (TOD): 1:00 AM TOD 1t Equal to one if the time was 1:00 AM.
Omitted: 12:00 AM (TOD 0t) 2:00 AM TOD 2t Equal to one if the time was 2:00 AM.
3:00 AM TOD 3t Equal to one if the time was 3:00 AM.
4:00 AM TOD 4t Equal to one if the time was 4:00 AM.
5:00 AM TOD 5t Equal to one if the time was 5:00 AM.
6:00 AM TOD 6t Equal to one if the time was 6:00 AM.
7:00 AM TOD 7t Equal to one if the time was 7:00 AM.
8:00 AM TOD 8t Equal to one if the time was 8:00 AM.
9:00 AM TOD 9t Equal to one if the time was 9:00 AM.
10:00 AM TOD 10t Equal to one if the time was 10:00 AM.
11:00 AM TOD 11t Equal to one if the time was 11:00 AM.
12:00 PM TOD 12t Equal to one if the time was 12:00 PM.
1:00 PM TOD 13t Equal to one if the time was 1:00 PM.
2:00 PM TOD 14t Equal to one if the time was 2:00 PM.
3:00 PM TOD 15t Equal to one if the time was 3:00 PM.
4:00 PM TOD 16t Equal to one if the time was 4:00 PM.
5:00 PM TOD 17t Equal to one if the time was 5:00 PM.
6:00 PM TOD 18t Equal to one if the time was 6:00 PM.
7:00 PM TOD 19t Equal to one if the time was 7:00 PM.
8:00 PM TOD 20t Equal to one if the time was 8:00 PM.
9:00 PM TOD 21t Equal to one if the time was 9:00 PM.
10:00 PM TOD 22t Equal to one if the time was 10:00 PM.
11:00 PM TOD 23t Equal to one if the time was 11:00 PM.
Day-of-Week (DOW): Tuesday Tuet Equal to one if the day was Tuesday.
Omitted: Monday (Mont) Wednesday Wedt Equal to one if the day was Wednesday.
Thursday Thut Equal to one if the day was Thursday.
Friday Frit Equal to one if the day was Friday.
Saturday Satt Equal to one if the day was Saturday.
Sunday Sunt Equal to one if the day was Sunday.
Holiday/Snow Days: Thanksgiving Thankst Equal to one if classes were canceled for Thanksgiving Break.
Winter Break Wintert Equal to one if classes were canceled for Winter Break.
Monday Holiday HolidayMt Equal to one if classes were canceled for Veterans’ Day or Presidents’ Day.
Spring Break Springt Equal to one if classes were canceled for Spring Break.
Snow Days Snowt Equal to one if classes were canceled due to snow.
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The specific parameter estimates from this regression are presented in Table 4.71. Over-
all the magnitude and significance levels of the resulting parameter estimates meet our ex-
pectations (i.e. electricity use is higher at end-units, decreases with temperature, increases
during evening hours, increases on snow days, etc). Despite our success at identifying impor-
tant determinants of electricity use, however, the R2 for our model is 0.211. This indicates
that there is still a large amount of variation that goes unexplained.
1Because of the variables’ proven significance, these variables are used as our standard control variables
later-on in the analysis.
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Table 4.7: Analysis of Energy-Use Determinants
OLS Regression Output
Variable Name Coefficient SE t p-value
Block 11i -0.072 0.007 -10.52 0
Block 12i -0.168 0.008 -19.91 0
Block 13i -0.013 0.007 -1.95 0.051
Block 14i -0.030 0.008 -3.57 0
Block 15i -0.186 0.007 -24.97 0
Block 16i -0.042 0.007 -5.73 0
Block 17i 0.031 0.007 4.44 0
Block 18i 0.074 0.007 10.3 0
Block 19i -0.125 0.007 -18.21 0
Block 20i 0.355 0.011 31.79 0
Block 21i -0.256 0.009 -28.82 0
Block 22i -0.073 0.011 -6.85 0
Block 23i 0.118 0.007 16.93 0
Block 24i -0.197 0.007 -28.75 0
Block 25i -0.101 0.007 -13.78 0
Block 26i 0.028 0.008 3.69 0
Block 27i 0.111 0.008 13.1 0
Block 28i 0.000 0.009 0.05 0.963
Block 29i 0.022 0.007 3.12 0.002
endi 0.054 0.003 17.23 0
tempt -0.022 0.000 -204.57 0
precipt 0.027 0.003 10.05 0
TOD 1t -0.045 0.009 -5.19 0
TOD 2t -0.080 0.009 -9.25 0
TOD 3t -0.090 0.009 -10.37 0
TOD 4t -0.082 0.009 -9.48 0
TOD 5t -0.064 0.009 -7.37 0
TOD 6t -0.034 0.009 -3.93 0
TOD 7t 0.046 0.009 5.25 0
TOD 8t 0.130 0.009 14.97 0
TOD 9t 0.124 0.009 14.27 0
TOD 10t 0.071 0.009 8.21 0
TOD 11t 0.024 0.009 2.73 0.006
TOD 12t 0.031 0.009 3.55 0
TOD 13t -0.018 0.009 -2.07 0.039
TOD 14t -0.092 0.009 -10.58 0
TOD 15t -0.124 0.009 -14.27 0
TOD 16t -0.108 0.009 -12.43 0
TOD 17t -0.037 0.009 -4.31 0
TOD 18t 0.042 0.009 4.81 0
TOD 19t 0.085 0.009 9.74 0
TOD 20t 0.092 0.009 10.59 0
TOD 21t 0.082 0.009 9.42 0
TOD 22t 0.072 0.009 8.27 0
TOD 23t 0.048 0.009 5.49 0
Tuet -0.053 0.005 -11.04 0
Wedt -0.014 0.005 -2.91 0.004
Thut 0.008 0.005 1.71 0.087
Frit -0.033 0.005 -6.72 0
Satt -0.012 0.005 -2.41 0.016
Sunt 0.019 0.005 3.87 0
HolidayMt -0.064 0.012 -5.37 0
Thankst 0.002 0.012 0.17 0.864
Wintert 0.016 0.003 5.22 0
Springt 0.004 0.005 0.67 0.506
Snowt 0.076 0.010 7.72 0
constant 1.265 0.009 140.14 0
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4.5 Disturbance Structure
Given that the data has both time-series and cross-sectional elements, it is a good idea
to see if heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are present in the data. We can check for
these by doing a number of tests and visual inspections.
4.5.1 “Eye-ball” Test for Autocorrelation
It is very common in time-series data for the disturbances from the present and past
periods be correlated with one another, which is again a violation of the classical regression
model assumption [CRMA] of zero correlation. We can see if this exists in the data visually
by plotting the residuals from our OLS model (Equation 4.1) against their lagged values. If
autocorrelation is present in the data, the residuals and their lagged values will be positively
related and there would be some suggestion of an upward-sloping trend.
Figure 4.5 plots the residuals from Equation 4.1 against their lagged values for six
randomly-selected weeks throughout the experimental period. Additionally Figure 4.6,
which also plots the residuals from equation 4.1 against their lagged values, restricts the
observations to six randomly-selected households during the pre-treatment period in order
to gain a slightly different perspective on the extent of the autocorrelation present in the
data. Residuals were plotted by week and by household to prevent the vast number of
observations from obscuring any pattern. Based off of the upward-sloping trend apparent
in the majority of these scatter plots, it does appear that the residuals and their lagged
values have a strong, positive correlation (i.e. there is autocorrelation).
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Figure 4.5: Residual vs. Lagged Residual
by Week
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Figure 4.6: Residual vs. Lagged Residual
by Household
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4.5.2 Wooldridge Test for Serial Correlation
To determine more formally whether autocorrelation is present in the data, we perform
the Wooldridge test for serial correlation. This test hinges upon the observation that when
there is no serial correlation between time periods, the correlation between the differenced
residuals and their lagged values is equal to -0.5. The null hypothesis of this test is thus:
H0 : corr(Δeit,Δeit–1) = –0.5. If we reject the hypothesis, then there is evidence to suggest
that serial correlation is present in the data.
This test was conducted on Equation 4.1 and the resulting test statistic was 115.213.
Evaluated using an F-distribution with one and 61 degrees of freedom, we reject the null
hypothesis, which implied possible serial correlation.
4.5.3 “Eye-Ball Test” for Heteroskedasticity
The CRMA also indicate that the cross-sections accross all time periods must have the
same variance. One place we might expect to see differences in variance, however, is between
households. Figure 4.7 plots the residuals against the fitted-values from Equation 4.1 for
six randomly selected households. If the variance was constant, then the upper and lower
bounds of the residuals would be roughly the same for each household. For the most part
this is what we see. Nevertheless households 60 and 116 do seem to have a larger variance
than the other households in the sample. Given that these households also appear to be
somewhat biased (residuals do not cluster around zero) this may simply indicate the need
for a model that can account for heteroskedasticity.
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Figure 4.7: Residual vs. Fitted-Value
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4.5.4 Breusch-Pagan test for Heteroskedasticity
To test to see if heteroskedasticity is present in the model we can also conduct a Breusch-
Pagan test. The Breusch-Pagan test is a Lagrange multiplier test performed on the residuals
from the OLS model (Equation 4.1 to determine the likelihood that the cross-products of
the residuals equal zero. If it turns out that the sum of the cross products of the residuals
do not equal zero, then there is evidence to support the existence of heterogeneity in the
error variance.
The test-statistic λ for the Breusch-Pagan test is:
λ = NT
2(T–1)
[
e¯(IN⊗jTj′T)e¯
e¯′e¯ – 1
]2
Where N is equal to the number of households, T is equal to the number of time periods,
e¯ is a vector of residuals from the OLS regression model, IN is an identity matrix, and jT is
a vector of ones. The test-statistic is 24,274.54. Evaluated using the test statistic χ2
(0.05,1)
,
the conclusion of the test result suggests that we reject the null hypothesis of constant
variance.
4.5.5 Goldfeld-Quandt Test for Heteroskedasticity
Another method of testing for heteroskedasticity is the Goldfeld-Quandt Test. To do this
we compare the variance of the high consumers of electricity to low consumers of electricity.
This test is performed under the presupposition that high and low consumers as two separate
groups experience different variance in their consumption habits overall. This test differs
from the Breusch-Pagan test because it looks at within-household heteroskedasticity as
opposed to between-household heteroskedasticity.
To define high and low electricity user we subtract hourly household consumption by the
average household consumption for that hour. We then take the average of the difference
for each observation throughout the pre-treatment period2 and if it is greater than zero the
household is defined as a high consumer, and if it is equal to or less than zero the household
2We only use households in the pre-treatment period to make this distinction in the event that the
treatments did have an effect that would affect the outcome of this test.
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is defined as a low consumer. The mathematical definition is provided below (see Appendix
C):
high-user if :
∑
xit–x¯t∑
ti
> 0
low-user if :
∑
xit–x¯t∑
ti
≤ 0
∀ti | ti is included in the pre-treatment period
where xit is the hourly electricity consumption measured in kWh at time t for household i;
and where x¯t is the mean hourly electricity consumption measured in kWh at time t for household all households.
(Due to an unequal number of observations per household, ti varies according to household.)
The Goldfeld-Quandt test statistic is attained by running the regression separately for
the high and low consumers and comparing the variance. To compare the two variances we
evaluate the ratio, σ2high/σ
2
low, and then use an F distribution to determine the probability
that this ratio is close to one. The null hypothesis of this test is that the ratio is equal
to one, which implies the groups are homoskedastic; the alternative hypothesis suggests
otherwise. The estimated variance was 0.324 for the high consumers and 0.318 for the low
consumers. The test statistic was therefore 0.984, which leads us to fail to reject the null
hypothesis when compared to the critical value of F3. In essence, this test does not lead us
to conclude that there is within-household heteroskedasticity.
3(F120846,97432,0.05 = 1.010.)
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CHAPTER 5
DEVELOPMENT OF EMPIRICAL MODEL
The development of the empirical model used to analyze treatment effects later-on hinges
on our assertion that the three different experimental groups should exhibit similar electric-
ity consumption behavior during the pre-treatment period. Depending on the characteristics
of the data, however, some empirical models may prove to be more appropriate than others
for analyzing treatments. These characteristics should reveal themselves when trying to
establish experimental group comparability during the pre-treatment period. This section
emphasizes the reasoning behind our ultimate empirical model.
5.1 ANOVA Analysis
Theoretically we know that the experimental groups should exhibit electricity consump-
tion habits that are roughly comparable, due to the randomization process used to assign
households to experimental groups. Prior to the start of the experiment, consenting house-
holds were assigned a random number using the rand() function in Excel. The households
were sorted from highest to lowest based off of this number and then the process was re-
peated to ensure randomness. The lowest third was then assigned to the control group,
the middle third was assigned to Treatment Group 2, and the remaining third was assigned
to Treatment Group 2. Because of this randomness, analysis of variance [ANOVA] would
seem to give us the desired result and provide us with a very simple model for analyzing
treatments.
The first method used to determine whether or not the experimental groups were com-
parable was to perform a two-way ANOVA that took into within-household variation. The
null hypothesis states that there is no systematic difference between the three experimental
groups; the alternative hypothesis suggests otherwise. If there were no systematic differ-
ences between the three groups, we would thus expect the F-statistic to be small and the
p-value (Prob>F) to be large.
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A series of ANOVA tests were performed on both the transformed data (lnkWh) and
the untransformed data (kWh) to check for systematic differences between the experimental
groups (see Table 5.1). The tests were repeated monthly to account for potential problems
resulting from having an unbalanced panel. The tests were also calculated at the hourly,
daily, and weekly levels in order to minimize the amount of total variation in the data.
Consistently the results of the tests suggest that the experimental groups exhibit differ-
ent electricity consumption behavior1. Only results from November and January suggest
otherwise when aggregated at the weekly level.
Table 5.1: Experimental Group Differences
2-Way ANOVA Analysis
Nov Dec Jan Feb ALL
Control: Avg kWh/hour 1.951 2.148 2.727 2.815 2.387
Treat 1: Avg kWh/hour 1.828 2.042 2.551 2.715 2.266
Treat 2: Avg kWh/hour 1.869 1.957 2.598 2.726 2.255
n 25873 40920 42504 16752 126049
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 0
Ln: Prob>F 0 0 0 0 0
Control: Avg kWh/day 46.743 51.562 65.445 67.555 57.261
Treat 1: Avg kWh/day 43.797 49.018 61.221 65.156 54.358
Treat 2: Avg kWh/day 44.767 46.961 62.34 65.431 54.1
n 1080 1705 1771 698 5254
Prob>F 0 0 0 0.05 0
Ln: Prob>F 0 0 0 0.02 0
Control: Avg kWh/week 298.725 366.543 460.379 479.563 397.057
Treat 1: Avg kWh/week 282.145 346.959 429.264 461.06 377.5
Treat 2: Avg kWh/week 287.151 333.663 441.438 465.899 376.313
n 157 275 229 124 785
Prob>F 0.21 0 0 0.02 0
Ln: Prob>F 0.25 0 0 0 0
ALL refers to all observations during pre-treatment period. Outliers removed. ANOVA takes into consideration
individual household variation.
1Quickly reviewing the mean consumption level for each of the experimental groups we seen that the
control group does consume more electricity than either treatment group each month.
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5.2 Regression Analysis
There are a number of reasons why ANOVA may have led to results that do not coincide
with theory. As previously established in Chapter 4, there are a number of highly influential
control variables motivating electricity use; Additionally we know that the disturbance
terms do not follow the classical regression model assumptions [CRMA]. Regression analysis,
therefore, provides and alternative method of analyzing treatment effects, which may be
more appropriate.
5.2.1 Important Control Variables
While the apartments are similar in square-footage area and amenities, we know from
Chapter 4 (see Table 4.7) that systematic household differences due to the physical housing
block the apartment resides or the location of the apartment within the housing block are
significant. If households are not evenly distributed amongst the housing blocks, or there
are more end-units in one experimental group than another, this could result in misleading
comparisons. Additionally, some of these differences could be attributed to time-variant
factors such as weather. Given that the numbers of observations per household vary, this
could be problematic if one group has a disproportionate number of observations taken
during the warmer months than the other. Other variables governing behavior and events
may also have had an effect.
To determine if this is the case, we ran an ordinary least squares [OLS] regression
(see Equation 5.1) on the natural log of hourly electricity consumption, ln(kWh)it, on two
dummy variables indicating whether the household had been assigned to Group 1 (Treat1i)
or Group 2 (Treat2i) and different combinations of our standard control variables, Xit (see
Table 4.6). Variable Treat1i is equal to one if household i was assigned to Treatment
Group 1; variable Treat2i is equal to one if household i was assigned to Treatment Group
22. If the coefficient on the variables indicating Treatment Group 1 and Treatment Group
2 were not significant it would suggest that experimental group differences were also not
significant once the other control variables had been accounted for. The random disturbance
2Note that these variables are time-invariant.
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is represented by εit.
lnkWhit = γ1Treat1i + γ2Treat2i +
∑
βrXit + εit (5.1)
Table 5.2 presents the regression results. Model 1a is the simplest model containing
none of the standard control variables; and Model 1f is the most complex containing all of
the standard control variables. With the exception of weather variables, the introduction of
control variables does very little to remedy the problem were were having with experimental
group equity. This means that even with the control variables, the differences between the
control and treatment groups still persisted. Nevertheless, as the control variables increase,
so does the value of the adjusted R2 indicating that the control variables do improve the
model to some extent and should be included in further regression analysis.
Table 5.2: Experimental Group Differences
OLS Regression
Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 1d Model 1e Model 1f
Treat1it -0.041*** -0.121*** -0.125*** -0.125*** -0.125*** -0.125***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Treat2it -0.057*** -0.138*** -0.133*** -0.133*** -0.133*** -0.133***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
HH Attr no yes yes yes yes yes
Weather no no yes yes yes yes
TOD no no no yes yes yes
DOW no no no no yes yes
Holidays/Snow Days no no no no no yes
n 126049 126049 126049 126049 126049 126049
adj R2 0.002 0.044 0.175 0.189 0.190 0.190
*Significant at the 10 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level.***Significant at the 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses.
See Table 4.6 for description of variable groups.
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5.2.2 Non-Spherical Disturbances and Household Specific Effects
Probably more important to the analysis of the experimental group differences than the
control variables is the error structure. In Chapter 4 we determined that there was some
evidence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. These play a large role in the efficiency
of the standard errors and thus inference. These can be accounted for, however, in the
empirical model.
Equation 5.2 is the random-effects [RE] model we use to analyze the differences between
experimental groups. The variables used are identical to the OLS regression equation 5.1
except that RE equation has an additional random, household-specific, disturbance (μi)
3.
The RE model utilizes the panel structure of the model, and allows the variance to vary
between households. This helps us to account for some of the heteroskedasticity in the
data, attributed to the between-household differences. Our results from the Breusch-Pagan
test performed in Chapter 4 is what leads us to believe that this type of heterogeneity may
exist.
lnkWhit = γ1Treat1i + γ2Treat2i +
∑
βrXit + μi + εit (5.2)
Table 5.3 presents the regression results. In comparison to the OLS regression results
(Model 1f), RE Models 2a through 2c exhibit slightly smaller parameter estimates and
larger standard errors, which reduces the signifcance level on the parameter estimates for
Treat1i and Treat2i. The straight-forward RE regression (Model 2a) suggests that the
different experimental groups are not statistically significant from one another. Neverthe-
3It is common to write this composite error term, (μi + εit), as a uit. Important to note is that, because
the RE model takes into consideration μi, corr(uit, ujt) 6= 0. The correlation between the error terms of the
individual households, however, is still zero (corr(uit, uis) = 0)). This is because μi is household-specific but
time-invariant.
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Table 5.3: Experimental Group Differences
RE Regression
Model 1f [OLS] Model 2a [RE] Model 2b [RE] Model 2c [RE]
Treat1i -0.125*** -0.112 -0.112 -0.112
(-0.005) (-0.096) (0.076) (0.076)
Treat2i -0.133*** -0.129 -0.129* -0.129*
(-0.005) (0.098) (0.077) (0.078)
AR(1) no no yes no
Clustered SE no no no yes
HH Attr yes yes yes yes
Weather yes yes yes yes
TOD yes yes yes yes
DOW yes yes yes yes
Holidays/Snow Days yes yes yes yes
n 126049 126049 126049 126049
adj R2 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
*Significant at the 10 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level.***Significant at the 1 percent level.
Standard errors in parentheses. See Table 4.6 for description of variable groups.
less, previous tests have suggested that corrections to the standard errors may be necessary
due to the presence of autocorrelation. Model 2b accounts for first-order autocorrelation
and finds Treat2i to be statistically significant at the ten percent level. This conclusion
was repeated when corrections were made to the standard errors to account for additional
heteroskedasticity45. This leads us to somewhat inconclusive results.
5.3 Discussion
What we can say with any certainty after our exploration of empirical models, is that
straight-forward analysis of variance [ANOVA], which is commonly used for analyzing treat-
ment effects, is not appropriate for analyzing our treatments given the nature of our data.
ANOVA did not lead us to the conclusion that our experimental groups exhibited compa-
rable electricity usage, which means that our empirical model must account for additional
factors that are beyond its scope.
Regression analysis on the other hand is more promising. Despite the fact that none of
the models tested gave strong results, it is not very likely that experimental group differences
4Clustering standard errors also helps to account for autocorrelation to some extent.
5This may be unnecessary given that the RE model already accounts for some of the between-household
heterogeneity and the Goldfeld-Quandt test did not lead us to conclude that within-household heterogeneity
was a problem.
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truly exist that cannot be rectified in the model. The most likely source of this discrepancy
may simply be due to the fact that we do not have access to important demographic
variables affecting electricity consumption, such as the number of residents living in each
household or temperature preferences. One way we can account for these missing variables
in our treatment analysis, however, is to use a fixed-effects [FE] model. We were not able to
use an FE model in this particular instance to test experimental group differences because
Treat1i and Treat2i are time-invariant variables. Nevertheless, an FE model would remove
the effects of the missing variables, assuming that, in the pre-treatment period, they are
time-invariant.
Additionally it must be pointed out that we are working with a very small number
of households. Kezdi (2004) notes in one article that the viability of using cluster-robust
standard errors in a panel model is particularly sensitive to the cross-sectional sample size,
and that even a very large number of time observations will not eliminate the reduction
in power. Nicols and Schaffer (2007) remark that when this is an issue, even the default
standard errors are preferable to the clustered standard errors. This means that, while cor-
rections for autocorrelation in our case are still necessary, correcting for clustered standard
errors may be detrimental to our analysis. For this reason, while it may be important to
view the impact of these revised errors on our parameter estimates as a robustness check,
we should probably not put too much stake in their ability to give us accurate conclusions.
Taking these points into consideration, the model we prefer to use in our analysis is an
FE model adjusted for first-order autocorrelation. The FE model, despite the efficiency loss,
has the benefit of being able to account for some of the omitted variables, which we believe
to be particularly important. Additionally, because our sample-size is small, we chose to
not put much emphasis on the inferences made in the presence of clustered standard errors.
Nevertheless, since we are aware of the autocorrelation present in the data, we will make a
correction for first-order autocorrelation.
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CHAPTER 6
RESULTS
In this chapter we analyze the treatment effects from four different angles. In the first
section we look at the average treatment effect overall. Then we separate at the effects of
negative and positive messaging in Section 6.2. In Sections 6.3 we observe how the impact
of the treatments changes throughout the day. The last section (6.4) evaluates treatment
effect duration.
6.1 Average Treatment Effects
To analyze the effect of the feedback and the social nudge treatments, we introduce two
new variables: Variable fdbkit is a dummy variable equal to one if the household i received
feedback on their energy use in a home electricity report [HER] at time t; Variable snit is
a dummy variable equal to one if the household i received the HER containing the social
nudge at time t. These variables should not be confused with Treat1i and Treat2i, which
are categorical and time-invariant throughout all phases of the experiment1, including the
pre-treatment period. Additionally variables fdbkit and snit are considered to be additive
because the HER with the social nudge also contains more general feedback on their elec-
tricity usage. Therefore a household receiving the HER with the social nudge would receive
a one for snit and a one for fdbkit.
Because of the reasons outlined in Chapter 5, we analyze six panel models the output
for which is presented in Table 6.1: three of the models are random-effects [RE] models
(Models 3a through 3c) and three of the models are fixed-effects [FE] models (Models 4a
through 4c). Models 3a and 4a are straight-forward panel models and do not account for
autocorrelation and assume complete homogeneity accross households and time periods;
Models 3b and 4b correct for autocorrelation; and Models 3c and 4c use clustered standard
1Variables fdbkit and snit can also be thought of as interaction terms between the categorical variables
(Treat1i and Treat2i) and the experimental period (pre-treatment period versus Phase 1 and Phase 2).
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errors to correct for heterskedasticity using clustered standard errors.
Equation 6.1 is the RE model used to analyze the treatment effects. The variables
incorporated into the model are the two treatment dummies, fdbkit and snit, and our stan-
dard control variables,
∑
Xit (see Table 4.6). They include household fixed-effects (housing
block and end unit), important weather variables (mean temperature and a dummy variable
for rain), and time-of-day fixed-effects, day-of-week fixed-effects, holiday fixed-effects, and
snow day fixed-effects. The intercept, α, is fixed in the RE model and accompanied by a
household-specific error component, μi, which allows for heterogeneity between households.
The random disturbance is εit.
lnkWhit = α + ρ1fdbkit + ρ2snit +
∑
βrXit + μi + εit (6.1)
Equation 6.2 is the FE model. The treatment and control variables are identical to
the RE model2, but the intercepts, αi, is household-specific and there is no random error
component, μi.
lnkWhit = αi + ρ1fdbkit + ρ2snit +
∑
βrXit + εit (6.2)
2Time-invariant variables, such as housing block number and end unit, are eliminated from the analysis
during the regression process.
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Table 6.1 presents our regression model results. In all six models, the parameter estimate
on feedback, fdbkit, is negative and range between -0.14 and -0.17. This suggests the
impact of the feedback treatment was to reduce household electricity use by 1.4 percent if
we assume our preferred model (Model 4b) is the most accurate. The parameter estimates
on the feedback treatment are statistically significant, however, in both RE and FE models
except when we cluster the standard errors; when we cluster the standard errors at the
household level to account for heterogeneity then the significance of the treatment effect is
lost3.
The parameter estimate of the social nudge, snit, on the other hand is positive and ranges
between 0.039 and 0.010. This translates into an increase in electricity use by 1.0 percent
if we look at our preferred model (Model 4b) as a result of adding the social nudge. While
the parameter estimate is only statistically significant in the straight-forward RE and FE
Models (Models 3a and 4a), it is still notable because it conflicts with our original hypothesis
that the social nudge would result in even larger decreases in electricity consumption than
feedback alone (see Chapter 3).
3See discussion on clustered standard errors in Chapter 5.
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Table 6.1: Average Treatment Effects
Model 3a [RE] Model 3b [RE] Model 3c [RE]
fdbkit -0.017*** -0.015** -0.017
(0.004) (0.008) (0.026)
snit 0.039*** 0.011 0.039
(0.006) (0.012) (0.05)
AR(1) no yes no
Clustered SE no no yes
HH Attr yes yes yes
Weather yes yes yes
TOD yes yes yes
DOW yes yes yes
Holidays/Snow Days yes yes yes
n 218387 218387 218387
adj R2 0.212 0.212 0.212
Model 4a [FE] Model 4b [FE] Model 4c [FE]
fdbkit -0.017*** -0.014* -0.017
(0.004) (0.008) (0.026)
snit 0.039*** 0.010 0.039
(0.006) (0.012) (0.050)
AR(1) no yes no
Clustered SE no no yes
HH Attr na na na
Weather yes yes yes
TOD yes yes yes
DOW yes yes yes
Holidays/Snow Days yes yes yes
n 218387 218325 218387
adj R2 0.181 0.18 0.181
Hausman Test
χ2 0.68 12.94 -
p-value 1 1 -
RE efficient RE efficient -
*Significant at the 10 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level.***Significant at the 1 percent level. Standard
errors in parentheses. See Table 4.6 for description of variable groups. Hausman test cannot be performed on clustered standard errors.
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Table 6.1 also includes a Hausman test statistic comparing the RE models to their
corresponding FE models. These tests suggest that it would be preferable to use an RE
model instead of an FE model in our analysis due to the efficiency gains. Nevertheless,
due to theoretical concerns and concerns over potential omitted variables, our preferred
model is a FE model. It should be noted, however, that regardless of the model we use,
the parameter estimates are all roughly the same. The largest change that occurs can be
found in Models 3b and 4b; the parameter estimate for feedback decreases in magnitude by
0.01 when evaluated using FE as opposed to RE and goes down in significance level. This
change, however, is not very large.
6.1.1 High- and Low- Users
Table 6.2 presents the regression results for equations 6.1 and 6.2 run separately on the
high- and low-consuming households as established during the pre-treatment period. Given
that these two groups generally exhibit different electricity use behavior (see Appendix C), it
is not surprising that they would react differently to the treatments; this is essentially what
our results tell us. High-users, represented in Models 3a.1 through 3c.1 and Models 4a.1
through 4c.1, do not seem to react to the treatments once corrections have been made to
the standard errors. In contrast, we find that low-users, represented in Models 3a.2 through
3c.2 and Models 4a.2 through 4c.2, did react. In fact, low-users were likely motivating the
significant results from the pooled regression models presented in Table 6.1. The effect of
the feedback treatment increases in magnitude when the sample is restricted to only low
consumers, from roughly a 1.4 percent reduction in electricity use to 3.8 percent reduction.
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Table 6.2: Average Treatment Effect
High- and Low- Users
HIGH-USERS LOW-USERS
Model 3a.1 [RE] Model 3b.1 [RE] Model 3c.1 [RE] Model 3a.2 [RE] Model 3b.2 [RE] Model 3c.2 [RE]
fdbkit 0.011* 0.014 0.011 -0.043*** -0.039*** -0.043
(0.006) (0.012) (0.034) (0.005) (0.009) (0.036)
snit 0.032*** 0.002 0.032 0.044*** 0.02 0.044
(0.009) (0.019) (0.044) (0.007) (0.014) (0.080)
AR(1) no yes no no yes no
Clustered SE no no yes no no yes
HH Attr yes yes yes yes yes yes
Weather yes yes yes yes yes yes
TOD yes yes yes yes yes yes
DOW yes yes yes yes yes yes
Holidays/Snow Days yes yes yes yes yes yes
n 97485 97485 97485 120902 120902 120902
adj R2 0.215 0.214 0.215 0.24 0.24 0.24
Model 4a.1 [FE] Model 4b.1 [FE] Model 4c.1 [FE] Model 4a.2 [FE] Model 4b.2 [FE] Model 4c.2 [FE]
fdbkit 0.011* 0.013 0.011 -0.043*** -0.038*** -0.043
(0.006) (0.012) (0.034) (0.005) (0.009) (0.036)
snit 0.032*** -0.0009 0.032 0.044*** 0.018 0.044
(0.009) (0.019) (0.044) (0.007) (0.015) (0.080)
AR(1) no yes no no yes no
Clustered SE no no yes no no yes
HH Attr na na na na na na
Weather yes yes yes yes yes yes
TOD yes yes yes yes yes yes
DOW yes yes yes yes yes yes
Holidays/Snow Days yes yes yes yes yes yes
n 97485 97457 97485 120902 120868 120902
adj R2 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.203 0.203 0.203
Hausman Test
χ2 3.58 13.57 - 0.73 13.65 -
p-value 1 1 - 1 1 -
RE efficient RE efficient RE efficient RE efficient
*Significant at the 10 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. ***Significant at the 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses. See Table 4.6 for description of variable groups.
Hausman test cannot be performed on clustered standard errors. See Appendix C for definitions of High- and Low-Users.
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6.2 Positive and Negative Messaging
Over the course of the experiment, 110 Home Electricity Reports [HERs] with the social
nudge were distributed. Forty-eight of these HERs reported that the resident was a below-
average consumer of electricity; sixty-two HERs reported that the resident was an above-
average consumer of electricity4. While there was no explicit value judgment present in
the HER with the social nudge, it may be the case that receiving an HER with a positive
message (that the resident consumed less than his or her neighbors) resulted in different
results than receiving an HER with a negative message (that the resident consumed more
than his or her neighbors). This investigation was motivated by previous research on the
Boomerang Effect (see Chapter 2), which could explain why we consistently see positive
parameter estimates on our variable for the social nudge treatment, snit.
To see if this was the case, the variable snit was replaced by the variables snGoodit
and snBadit. Variable snGoodit is a dummy variable equal to one if the resident received
an HER that week indicating that they were an average or below-average consumer of
electricity. Conversely, variable snBadit is a dummy variable equal to one if the resident
received an HER that week indicating that they were an above-average consumer. While the
variables are mutually exclusive (the household could not receive a one for both snGoodit
and snBadit), households can receive a one for snGoodit one week and the a one for snBadit
the next.
Equations 6.3 and 6.4 present the random-effects [RE] and fixed-effects [FE] models
used to analyze the treatment effects. In equation 6.3, the RE model, lnkWhit is the
natural log of hourly electricity consumption, fdbkit is a dummy variable equal to one if the
household received a HER with feedback, snGoodit and snBadit are our dummy variables
equal to one if the household received a “positive” or “negative” message respectively on
their previous HER, and
∑
βrXit represent the standard control variables, which include
controls for household attributes, weather variables, time-of-day fixed-effects, day-of-week
fixed-effects, and dfixed-effects indicating whether school was canceled for a holiday or snow
day (see Table 4.6). The composite error term for the RE is (μi + εit).
4No household over the course of the experiment consumed the weekly average amount of electricity.
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lnkWhit = α + ρ1fdbkit + θ1snGoodit + θ2snBadit +
∑
βrXit + μi + εit (6.3)
Equation 6.4 is the corresponding FE model. In contrast to equation 6.3, equation 6.4
contains individual intercepts for each of the households, αi. It does not however contain
the individual-specific error term, μi.
lnkWhit = αi + ρ1fdbkit + θ1snGoodit + θ2snBadit +
∑
βrXt + εit (6.4)
Table 6.3 presents the regression results for both of these equations under a number of
assumptions regarding the standard errors. Our preferred model is Model 6b. The first
observation to be made about this model is that the parameter estimates for the “posi-
tive” HERs (snGoodit) is positive while the parameter estimates for the “negative” HERs
(snBadit) is negative. This suggests convergence towards the average consumption level,
though the parameter estimate for snBadit is not statistically significant. The implication
of this is that, while giving residents access to feedback on their electricity consumption
will lead to approximately 1.4 percent decreases, if the resident discovers that he or she is
a “good” consumer of electricity, he or she will increase his or her electricity consumption
by 3.9 percent. The net effect of feedback and the social nudge is essentially positive.
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Table 6.3: Treatment Effects
Positive and Negative Messaging
Model 5a [RE] Model 5b [RE] Model 5c [RE]
fdbkit -0.017*** -0.015** -0.017
(0.004) (0.008) (0.026)
snGoodit 0.069*** 0.038** 0.069
(0.008) (0.016) (0.071)
snBadit 0.015** -0.011 0.015
(0.007) (0.014) (0.726)
AR(1) no yes no
Clustered SE no no yes
HH Attr yes yes yes
Weather yes yes yes
TOD yes yes yes
DOW yes yes yes
Holidays/Snow Days yes yes yes
n 218387 218387 218387
adj R2 0.211 0.211 0.211
Model 6a [FE] Model 6b [FE] Model 6c [FE ]
fdbkit -0.017*** -0.014* -0.017
(0.004) (0.008) (0.026)
snGoodit 0.07*** 0.039** 0.07
(0.008) (0.016) (0.071)
snBadit 0.15** -0.013 0.015
(0.007) (0.014) (0.043)
AR(1) no yes no
Clustered SE no no yes
HH Attr na na na
Weather yes yes yes
TOD yes yes yes
DOW yes yes yes
Holidays/Snow Days yes yes yes
n 218387 218325 218387
adj R2 0.179 0.179 0.179
Hausman Test
χ2 9.71 31.28 -
p-value 1 0.806 -
RE efficient RE efficient
*Significant at the 10 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. ***Significant at the 1 percent level.
Standard errors in parentheses. See Table 4.6 for description of variable groups. Hausman test cannot be performed
on clustered standard errors.
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6.2.1 High- and Low-Users
These models can also be used to look at the effect of positive and negative messaging
from the perspective of high- and low- electricity users. This should be done with an
air of caution however because dividing the sample between high- and low- users restricts
the number of households informing the parameter estimates on snGoodit and snBadit
significantly. Additionally, when we evaluate the effect of negative and positive messaging
there is a relationship between being low-consumers receiving an HER with a positive
message and high-consumers receiving an HER with a negative message. In fact, in the case
of high-consumers, there was no instance in which a household that was labeled a high-user
during the pre-treatment period received an HER with a positive message. Twenty-six
percent of the HERs distributed to the low-users, however, did convey a negative message.
Table 6.4 presents the regression results when equations 6.3 and 6.4 are run on high
and low electricity users separately. When we do this we see that, while high electricity
users do not appear to react to our treatments, low electricity users react to both negative
and positive messaging. If we look at our preferred model, Model 6b.2, low-users increase
electricity consumption by 4.2 percent when they receive a positive message, whereas they
decrease their electricity consumption by 4.8 percent when they receive a negative message.
This latter finding is particularly weak, however, as it is based on off of only 2,852 hourly
observations, whereas the effect of positive messaging amongst the low-users are based off
of 8,055 hourly observations. Nevertheless this finding stresses the notion that positive
messaging to low-consumers can lead to increases in electricity consumption, and provides
evidence in support of the Boomerange Effect.
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Table 6.4: Negative and Positive Messaging
High- and Low-Users
HIGH-USERS LOW-USERS
Model 5a.1 [RE] Model 5b.1 [RE] Model 5c.1 [RE] Model 5a.2 [RE] Model 5b.2 [RE] Model 5c.2 [RE]
fdbk 0.011* 0.014 0.011 -0.043*** -0.039*** -0.043
(0.006) (0.012) (0.034) (0.005) (0.009) (0.036)
snGood - - - 0.069*** 0.043*** 0.069
(0.008) (0.016) (0.075)
snBad 0.032*** 0.002 0.032 -0.027** -0.048** -0.027
(0.009) (0.019) (0.043) (0.012) (0.024) (0.116)
AR(1) no yes no no yes no
Clustered SE no no yes no no yes
HH Attr yes yes yes yes yes yes
Weather yes yes yes yes yes yes
TOD yes yes yes yes yes yes
DOW yes yes yes yes yes yes
Holidays/Snow Days yes yes yes yes yes yes
n 97485 97485 97485 120902 120902 120902
adj R2 0.215 0.214 0.215 0.239 0.239 0.239
Model 6a.1 [FE] Model 6b.1 [FE] Model 6c.1 [FE ] Model 6a.2 [FE] Model 6b.2 [FE] Model 6c.2 [FE ]
fdbk 0.011* 0.013 0.011 -0.043*** -0.038*** -0.043
(0.006) (0.012) (0.034) (0.005) (0.009) (0.036)
snGood - - - 0.069*** 0.042*** 0.069
(0.008) (0.016) (0.075)
snBad 0.031*** -0.001 0.031 -0.027** -0.051** -0.027
(0.009) (0.019) (0.043) (0.012) (0.024) (0.116)
AR(1) no yes no no yes no
Clustered SE no no yes no no yes
HH Attr na na na na na na
Weather yes yes yes yes yes yes
TOD yes yes yes yes yes yes
DOW yes yes yes yes yes yes
Holidays/Snow Days yes yes yes yes yes yes
n 97485 97457 97485 120902 120868 120902
adj R2 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.202 0.202 0.202
Hausman Test
χ2 3.58 13.58 - 1 14.35 -
p-value 1 1 - 1 1 -
RE efficient RE efficient RE efficient RE efficient
*Significant at the 10 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. ***Significant at the 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses. See Table 4.6 for description of variable groups.
Hausman test cannot be performed on clustered standard errors. See Appendix C for definitions of High- and Low-Users.
6.3 Time-of-Day Treatment Effects
In addition to analyzing the effect of the treatments overall, we can also look at the
effect of the treatments at different times of the day. Analyzing the treatment effects at
different times of the day may give us insight into the types of changes (if any) being made
to reduce electricity consumption.
Figure 6.1 depicts the average electricity consumption for our sample participants over
the course of the experiment (November 11, 2014 through April 15, 2015) at each hour
of the day. As expected, there are two high electricity usage peaks in the data, which
correspond to heightened activity during the morning and evening hours. Then there is a
mid-day lull is likely due to the fact that the majority of residents are gone during the day,
and a late-night/early-morning lull that can be explained by the fact that the residents are
probably asleep.
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Figure 6.1: Average Time-of-Day Consumption
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One method for determining whether or not the feedback and the social nudge treat-
ments affected electricity consumption differently at different times of the day is to inter-
act the time-of-day variables with the treatment variables. This is done by multiplying
the treatment variables, fdbkit and snit, with the time-of-day control variables, TOD 0t-
TOD 23t. This creates two series of 24 interaction variables with the feedback treatment,
fdbkTOD 0it-fdbkTOD 23it, and the social nudge treatment, fdbkTOD 0it-fdbkTOD 23it
(see Table 6.5)5.
5These variables would not replace the inclusion of time-of-day control variables, TOD 1t-TOD 23t,
which are necessary for capturing the conventional time-of-day effects that are not related to the treatments.
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Table 6.5: Outline of Time-of-Day Interaction Effects
Variable Group Variable Variable Name Description
Time-of-Day Feedback Treatment * 12am fdbkTOD 0 Equal to one if household received the feedback treatment and it was 12am
Interaction Term Feedback Treatment * 1am fdbkTOD 1 Equal to one if household received the feedback treatment and it was 1am
with Feedback Feedback Treatment * 2am fdbkTOD 2 Equal to one if household received the feedback treatment and it was 2am
Feedback Treatment * 3am fdbkTOD 3 Equal to one if household received the feedback treatment and it was 3am
Feedback Treatment * 4am fdbkTOD 4 Equal to one if household received the feedback treatment and it was 4am
Feedback Treatment * 5am fdbkTOD 5 Equal to one if household received the feedback treatment and it was 5am
Feedback Treatment * 6am fdbkTOD 6 Equal to one if household received the feedback treatment and it was 6am
Feedback Treatment * 7am fdbkTOD 7 Equal to one if household received the feedback treatment and it was 7am
Feedback Treatment * 8am fdbkTOD 8 Equal to one if household received the feedback treatment and it was 8am
Feedback Treatment * 9am fdbkTOD 9 Equal to one if household received the feedback treatment and it was 9am
Feedback Treatment * 10am fdbkTOD 10 Equal to one if household received the feedback treatment and it was 10am
Feedback Treatment * 11am fdbkTOD 11 Equal to one if household received the feedback treatment and it was 11am
Feedback Treatment * 12pm fdbkTOD 12 Equal to one if household received the feedback treatment and it was 12pm
Feedback Treatment * 1pm fdbkTOD 13 Equal to one if household received the feedback treatment and it was 1pm
Feedback Treatment * 2pm fdbkTOD 14 Equal to one if household received the feedback treatment and it was 2pm
Feedback Treatment * 3pm fdbkTOD 15 Equal to one if household received the feedback treatment and it was 3pm
Feedback Treatment * 4pm fdbkTOD 16 Equal to one if household received the feedback treatment and it was 4pm
Feedback Treatment * 5pm fdbkTOD 17 Equal to one if household received the feedback treatment and it was 5pm
Feedback Treatment * 6pm fdbkTOD 18 Equal to one if household received the feedback treatment and it was 6pm
Feedback Treatment * 7pm fdbkTOD 19 Equal to one if household received the feedback treatment and it was 7pm
Feedback Treatment * 8pm fdbkTOD 20 Equal to one if household received the feedback treatment and it was 8pm
Feedback Treatment * 9pm fdbkTOD 21 Equal to one if household received the feedback treatment and it was 9pm
Feedback Treatment * 10pm fdbkTOD 22 Equal to one if household received the feedback treatment and it was 10pm
Feedback Treatment * 11pm fdbkTOD 23 Equal to one if household received the feedback treatment and it was 11pm
Time-of-Day Social Nudge Treatment * 12am snTOD 0 Equal to one if household received the social nudge treatment and it was 12am
Interaction Term Social Nudge Treatment * 1am snTOD 1 Equal to one if household received the social nudge treatment and it was 1am
with the Social Nudge Social Nudge Treatment * 2am snTOD 2 Equal to one if household received the social nudge treatment and it was 2am
Social Nudge Treatment * 3am snTOD 3 Equal to one if household received the social nudge treatment and it was 3am
Social Nudge Treatment * 4am snTOD 4 Equal to one if household received the social nudge treatment and it was 4am
Social Nudge Treatment * 5am snTOD 5 Equal to one if household received the social nudge treatment and it was 5am
Social Nudge Treatment * 6am snTOD 6 Equal to one if household received the social nudge treatment and it was 6am
Social Nudge Treatment * 7am snTOD 7 Equal to one if household received the social nudge treatment and it was 7am
Social Nudge Treatment * 8am snTOD 8 Equal to one if household received the social nudge treatment and it was 8am
Social Nudge Treatment * 9am snTOD 9 Equal to one if household received the social nudge treatment and it was 9am
Social Nudge Treatment * 10am snTOD 10 Equal to one if household received the social nudge treatment and it was 10am
Social Nudge Treatment * 11am snTOD 11 Equal to one if household received the social nudge treatment and it was 11am
Social Nudge Treatment * 12pm snTOD 12 Equal to one if household received the social nudge treatment and it was 12pm
Social Nudge Treatment * 1pm snTOD 13 Equal to one if household received the social nudge treatment and it was 1pm
Social Nudge Treatment * 2pm snTOD 14 Equal to one if household received the social nudge treatment and it was 2pm
Social Nudge Treatment * 3pm snTOD 15 Equal to one if household received the social nudge treatment and it was 3pm
Social Nudge Treatment * 4pm snTOD 16 Equal to one if household received the social nudge treatment and it was 4pm
Social Nudge Treatment * 5pm snTOD 17 Equal to one if household received the social nudge treatment and it was 5pm
Social Nudge Treatment * 6pm snTOD 18 Equal to one if household received the social nudge treatment and it was 6pm
Social Nudge Treatment * 7pm snTOD 19 Equal to one if household received the social nudge treatment and it was 7pm
Social Nudge Treatment * 8pm snTOD 20 Equal to one if household received the social nudge treatment and it was 8pm
Social Nudge Treatment * 9pm snTOD 21 Equal to one if household received the social nudge treatment and it was 9pm
Social Nudge Treatment * 10pm snTOD 22 Equal to one if household received the social nudge treatment and it was 10pm
Social Nudge Treatment * 11pm snTOD 23 Equal to one if household received the social nudge treatment and it was 11pm
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Equation 6.5 is the model we use to analyze these effects. Equation 6.5 is a fixed-
effects [FE] model adjusted for first-order autocorrelation6. Variables fdbkTOD 0it through
fdbkTOD 23it and snTOD 0it through snTOD 23it are the interaction terms between the
treatments and time-of-day variables. The standard control variables,
∑
βrX, account for
weather, time-of-day fixed-effects, day-of-week fixed-effects, and holiday fixed-effects or snow
days fixed-effects (see Table 4.6). Note that fdbkit and snit have been excluded from the
model. This is because we want to see the specific impact of the treatments at each time
of the day and not evaluate the general effect of the treatments.
lnkWhit = αi +
23∑
j=0
ξjfdbkTOD jit +
23∑
j=0
ζjsnTOD jit +
∑
βrXit + εit
∀j |j = 0 – 23 (6.5)
Equation 6.5 was fitted to all of the data, as well as separately between the high- and
low- electricity users. The estimation results are presented in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. Table 6.6
looks specifically at the effect of feedback-time-of-day interaction effects. When we evaluate
the model that was run on all observations (Model 7), we see that the significant reductions
due to feedback occurred during the night (9pm to 2am). The largest reduction we see
is a 6.4 percent reduction in electricity-use that appears at 11pm (fdbkTOD 23it). Once
we divide our sample between high- and low-users (Models 7.1 and 7.2) we see that the
night-time reductions that resulted from the feedback treatment in Model 7 were strongly
in large-part by the low-users. This is consistent with all of our previous findings. Starting
at 3pm and continuing all the way until 2am we see significant electricity-use reductions
amongst low-users. These reductions reach as high as 11.0 percent.
6For the remainder of the analysis in Sections 3 and 4, only the preferred model will be used.
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Table 6.6: Feedback - TOD Interaction Effects
ALL HIGH-USERS LOW-USERS
Model 7 [FE] Model 7.1 [FE] Model 7.2 [FE]
fdbkTOD 0it -0.032** 0.031 -0.077***
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020)
fdbkTOD 1it -0.034** 0.017 -0.069***
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020)
fdbkTOD 2it -0.035** -0.011 -0.053***
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020)
fdbkTOD 3it 0.000 0.020 -0.018
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020)
fdbkTOD 4it -0.014 0.008 -0.036*
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020)
fdbkTOD 5it 0.023 0.039* 0.001
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020)
fdbkTOD 6it -0.002 0.004 -0.018
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020)
fdbkTOD 7it 0.011 0.001 0.002
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020)
fdbkTOD 8it 0.045* 0.029 0.038***
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020)
fdbkTOD 9it 0.032*** 0.054*** 0.005
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020)
fdbkTOD 10it 0.011 0.027 -0.006
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020)
fdbkTOD 11it 0.014 0.034 -0.003
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020)
fdbkTOD 12it -0.022 -0.012 -0.030
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020)
fdbkTOD 13it -0.011 0.007 -0.027
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020)
fdbkTOD 14it 0.006 0.034 -0.020
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020)
fdbkTOD 15it 0.000 0.049** -0.042**
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020)
fdbkTOD 16it -0.023 -0.007 -0.041**
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020)
fdbkTOD 17it -0.070*** -0.059** -0.084***
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020)
fdbkTOD 18it -0.057*** -0.037 -0.076***
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020)
fdbkTOD 19it -0.025 0.027 -0.065***
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020)
fdbkTOD 20it -0.018 0.040* -0.063***
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020)
fdbkTOD 21it -0.026* 0.004 -0.051***
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020)
fdbkTOD 22it -0.035** 0.016 -0.074***
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020)
fdbkTOD 23it -0.065*** -0.007 -0.110***
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020)
AR(1) yes yes yes
Clustered SE no no no
HH Attr na na na
Weather yes yes yes
TOD yes yes yes
DOW yes yes yes
Holidays/Snow Days yes yes yes
n 218325 97457 120868
adj R2 0.181 0.182 0.204
*Significant at the 10 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. ***Significant at the 1 percent level.
Standard errors in parentheses. See Table 4.6 for description of variable groups.
See Appendix C for definitions of High- and Low-Users.
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Now we turn our attention to the results of equation 6.5, which measure the effects of
the social nudge throughout the day7. Not surprisingly, given our earlier results suggested
that overall the social nudge treatment was ineffectual, there is not a very clear pattern
articulating the effect of the social nudge at different times of the day. Significant results
indicate that the social nudge led to brief increases in electricity use in the morning, and
brief decreases in the electricity use around noon.
More surprising results appear when the sample is divided between high and low users.
Among high-users, there are significant increases in electricity-use during the morning hours
that range between 7.4 and 15.4 percent. Conversely, during mid-day hours, we see signif-
icant electricity decreases between 8.2 and 14.9 percent. This suggests that high-users did
respond to the social nudge, just not enough to be significant overall. One possible, but
unlikely, explanation may be that the residents unintentionally deferred electricity-use to
the morning hours.
Time-of-day effects among low-users (Model7.2) meanwhile do not seem to follow any
specific pattern.
7The parameter estimates presented in Table 6.7 are for the same models presented in Table 6.6. The
results were split into two tables for the sake of simplicity.
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Table 6.7: Social Nudge - TOD Interaction Effects
ALL HIGH-USERS LOW-USERS
Model 7 [FE] Model 7.1 [FE] Model 7.2 [FE]
snTOD 0 -0.022 -0.050 -0.002
(0.024) (0.038) (0.031)
snTOD 1 0.009 -0.072* 0.064**
(0.024) (0.039) (0.031)
snTOD 2 0.012 -0.072* 0.070**
(0.025) (0.039) (0.032)
snTOD 3 -0.004 -0.068* 0.042
(0.025) (0.039) (0.032)
snTOD 4 0.002 -0.057 0.044
(0.025) (0.039) (0.032)
snTOD 5 0.003 -0.004 0.010
(0.025) (0.039) (0.032)
snTOD 6 0.018 -0.010 0.040
(0.025) (0.039) (0.032)
snTOD 7 0.084*** 0.074** 0.093***
(0.025) (0.039) (0.032)
snTOD 8 0.059** 0.178*** -0.021
(0.025) (0.039) (0.032)
snTOD 9 0.027 0.154*** -0.060*
(0.025) (0.039) (0.032)
snTOD 10 0.061*** 0.111*** 0.026
(0.025) (0.039) (0.032)
snTOD 11 0.031 0.046 0.021
(0.025) (0.039) (0.032)
snTOD 12 0.041* 0.080** 0.014
(0.025) (0.039) (0.032)
snTOD 13 -0.002 0.064* -0.048
(0.025) (0.039) (0.032)
snTOD 14 -0.028 -0.113*** 0.031
(0.025) (0.039) (0.032)
snTOD 15 -0.065*** -0.130*** -0.020
(0.025) (0.039) (0.032)
snTOD 16 -0.097*** -0.149*** -0.059*
(0.025) (0.039) (0.032)
snTOD 17 -0.055** -0.082** -0.035
(0.025) (0.039) (0.032)
snTOD 18 -0.007 -0.011 -0.004
(0.025) (0.039) (0.032)
snTOD 19 0.015 -0.009 0.032
(0.025) (0.039) (0.032)
snTOD 20 0.069*** -0.013 0.126***
(0.025) (0.039) (0.032)
snTOD 21 0.031 0.028 0.034
(0.025) (0.039) (0.032)
snTOD 22 0.037 0.051 0.027
(0.025) (0.039) (0.031)
snTOD 23 0.020 0.039 0.007
(0.024) (0.038) (0.031)
AR(1) yes yes yes
Clustered SE no no no
HH Attr na na na
Weather yes yes yes
TOD yes yes yes
DOW yes yes yes
Holidays/Snow Days yes yes yes
n 218325 97457 120868
adj R2 0.181 0.182 0.204
*Significant at the 10 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. ***Significant at the 1 percent level.
Standard errors in parentheses. See Table 4.6 for description of variable groups.
See Appendix C for definitions of High- and Low-Users.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
The results of our field experiment indicate that feedback and social nudges do impact
electricity use. We found that on average feedback reduced electricity consumption by
approximately 1.4 percent. This finding was strongest amongst low electricity users, who
decreased electricity consumption as a result of feedback by 3.8 percent.
The social nudge, however, did not reveal itself as being particularly influential to
electricity-use behavior until we separated the effect of a positive social nudge (i.e. an
HER indicating the resident was a below-average consumer of electricity) from that of a
negative social nudge (i.e. an HER indicating the resident was an above-average consumer
of electricity). When the two effects were separated, we found that the social nudges were
influential on average, if the resident received a positive social nudge. In this case electric-
ity consumption increased by 3.9 percent. When we divided the sample between high- and
low-electricity users, the magnitude of our finding increased to a 4.2 percent amongst low-
users. Amongst low-users, the negative social nudge was also found to result in significant
reductions in electricity-use (5.1 percent).
Analyzing time-of-day effects helped us to understand when these changes in electricity-
use behavior were taking place. Overall, there was no clear pattern; significant increases
and decreases appeared to be random. When the data was analyzed separately for high-
and low-users, there were two notable observations: first, low-users responded particularly
strongly to the feedback treatment during the evening and night hours; second, high-users
responded to the social nudge treatment, however significant electricity reductions that
occurred during mid-day were counter balanced by significant electricity increases in the
morning.
Sample-size and lack of demographic information are the most significant drawbacks to
our study. Had we increased the number of households in our sample, we believe that our
findings would have been robust to clustered standard errors. Demographic information we
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believe would have also improved the model, however this information was not available.
These variables would include: temperature preferences, the number of members present
in the household, country of origin, native language, and profession. While we attempted
to account for these variables by using the fixed-effect [FE] model, it may be the case that
some of these factors were not time-invariant; in this case an FE would not be able to
account for these differences.
Nevertheless our study has a number of strengths. In contrast to other studies, we
have truly managed to distinguish the effects of feedback and the social nudge. We did
this by first, positioning the experiment in a context void of any financial incentive to save
electricity, and second, by stacking our treatments so that we could differentiate the simple
effect of the feedback versus the social nudge.
Our study also has several practical implications. Most importantly we have shown
that it is valuable to give residents access to their energy-use information even if there
is no financial incentive present to save energy. A subset of the population does seem to
value energy conservation for personal reasons that are not dependent on financial gains.
Providing residents with information on their energy consumption reminds residents that
their energy-use behavior does have consequences and promotes learning on the best means
of saving energy. Unfortunately this information is only likely to impact those residents
who are already consuming low-levels of energy. All energy saving nevertheless should be
valued.
Additionally this study suggests that large-scale energy-efficiency programs that use so-
cial comparisons to motivate individuals to save energy - such as the OPower home energy
reports - may want to diversify the types of social nudges they use to motivate their cus-
tomers. Our study showed that low-consumers were most effected by the social comparisons,
however this resulted in increases in energy use not decreases. While social comparisons
have been proven to reduce energy consumption on average by roughly two percent, other
types of social nudges may produce even more substantial results. Therefore, we suggest
that future research in this area be aimed at health- or environmental-based social nudges.
These types of social nudges are less likely to negatively affect low energy-users because the
low energy-users will not be compared to households performing worse that them.
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APPENDIX A
METERING ISSUES AND IMPACT ON DISTRIBUTION
OF OBSERVATIONS
Due to the issues we experienced with the meters (e.g. defective meter that needed to
be replaces, problem with the initial installation, etc.), the number of observations recorded
during the pre-treatment period and Phase 1 of the experiment vary by household. Table
A.1 provides a complete breakdown of when each household began recording data and which
group it affected1. Ninety-seven of the households began recording data on November 11,
2014, which we consider to be the official starting date of our experiment. Twenty-three
others were delayed: eight households began collecting data on November 13, 2014; seven
households began collecting data on November 14, 2014; two households began recording on
January 13, 2015; and six households began collecting data on February 11, 2015. Given that
Phase 1 was scheduled to start on February 12, 2015 and six households began recording
data February 11, 2015, the pre-treatment period for these six households was extended
until until February 26, 2015.
1All households were connected to eGauge meters, including those that were vacant or did not wish to
participate in the experiment.
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Table A.1 also displays how the issues with the metering affected the households accord-
ing to their housing status (experimental group, experiment participation, and vacancy).
All 120 one-bedroom households were ultimately connected to eGauge electricity meters. Of
the 120, 23 were vacant, 33 did not express any interest in participating in the experiment,
and 64 agreed to participate in the experiment. The 64 households were randomly divided
into the experimental groups: 21 were assigned to the control group; 22 were assigned to
Treatment Group 1; and 22 were assigned to Treatment Group 2.
Table A.1: Household Status
Household Status
1-Bedroom Households
Vacant
Non-Vacant
No Consent
Consent
Control Treat 1 SN Treat
Data Collection Begins
11-Nov 20 26 17 16 18
13-Nov 0 4 1 2 1
14-Nov 1 2 1 1 2
13-Jan 1 0 0 1 0
11-Feb 1 1 2 1 1
Household Totals
23
33
21 21 22
64
97
120
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APPENDIX B
RECRUITMENT
Only non-vacant, one-bedroom households were eligible to participate in this study.
This was the case for two reasons: (1) by restricting our households to households of a
similar size containing similar amenities, we could retain some level of homogeneity; and
(2) financial resources limited the number of meters that could be purchased.
In November, prior to the start of the experiment, households eligible to participate
in the experiment were sent a letter in the mail introducing the study asking them to
participate (see Figure B.1) and a consent form to be mailed back to us (see Figure B.2).
This was followed by a mass email containing the same introduction letter and a link to an
electronic consent form, which was sent to all of the residents of one-bedroom apartments
in the North Village Apartments [NVA] by the NVA central office. It was crucial that
residents sign the consent form if they were interested in participating, because of University
of Massachusetts Amherst regulations concerning the use of human subjects in experiments.
In return for their voluntary consent, residents were entered into a lottery to win various cash
prizes. In the end, 64 households agreed to participate in the experiment. This amounted
to 66 percent of all eligible households. Letter of introduction and consent form can be
found in Appendix B.1 and AB.2.
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B.1 Letter of Introduction
Figure B.1: Introduction Letter
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS Department of Resource Economics 
AMHERST  http://www.umass.edu/resec 
216 Stockbridge Hall   
80 Campus Center Way 
Amherst, MA  01003-9246   
 
 
 
November 17, 2014 
 
 
Dear North Village resident, 
 
 
The Resource Economics Department at the University of Massachusetts Amherst would like to 
invite you to take part in a study on household electricity consumption. This study seeks to 
evaluate the role of information in households’ decisions regarding electricity consumption. It is 
our hope that these findings will be instrumental in the creation of more efficient and effective 
energy policies.  
 
Please sign up at our website www.bit.do/nvaconsent or return the enclosed consent form by 
mail using the envelope provided by November 26
th
, 2014. If you agree to participate, your 
household’s electricity consumption will be measured during the months of November through 
April and there is a possibility that you will receive Home Electricity Reports containing 
information about your household’s electricity usage. Because we appreciate your help, you 
will be entered into a lottery and earn the chance to win one of twelve cash prizes: $1000, 
$500, or one of ten $100 prizes. The lottery drawing will take place December 12
th
, 2014.  
 
All of your electricity consumption data will be kept strictly confidential, and Residential Life 
will not have access to any of your household’s electricity consumption. If you have any 
questions or concerns about this study feel free to contact Dr. Christine Crago at: 
ccrago@resecon.umass.edu or 545-5738. We look forward to hearing from you!  
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
Dr. Christine Crago 
Department of Resource Economics 
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
 
 
67
B.2 Consent Form
Figure B.2: Consent Form
CONSENT FORM 
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
HUMAN SUBJECTS INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD 
 
 
Introduction to the study: The Resource Economics department at the University of Massachusetts Amherst would 
like to invite you to participate in a study on household electricity consumption. The primary objective of this study 
is to examine the effect of information on electricity consumption. While we hope to publish the results of this study 
in a scientific journal, we stress that no personally identifiable information will be published.  
 
What will happen during the study: Electricity meters have recently been installed in your building. If you are 
selected to participate in this study, your apartment’s electricity consumption will be measured during the months of 
November to April.  You may also be selected to receive weekly Home Electricity Consumption Reports. In 
addition, you may be eligible to receive financial incentives based on your energy use. 
 
Compensation: If you choose to participate in this study, you will be entered into a lottery and have the chance to 
win one of the following cash prizes: $1000, $500, or one of ten $100 prizes.   
 
Who to go to with questions: If you have any questions or concerns about being in this study, or if you would like 
more information about this research project you should contact Dr. Christine Crago in the Dept. of Resource 
Economics at ccrago@resecon.umass.edu or 413-545-5738. 
 
How participants’ privacy is protected: The principal investigator, Dr. Christine Crago, will be the only individual 
with access to the names of participants. This information will be kept for consent and compensation purposes only 
and will be kept strictly confidential. Throughout the experiment period, your name will not be linked to your 
apartment number.  Your apartment’s energy consumption will be known only to study researchers and WILL NOT 
be shared with any other party. All electronic data collected will be stored on password protected computers. 
 
Risks and discomforts: We do not know of any personal risk or discomfort from being in this study. 
 
Your rights: If you do not sign this consent form, you will automatically be excluded from the study. However, if 
you sign this consent form and later on decide that you no longer wish to participate in the study, you may withdraw 
by contacting Dr. Christine Crago by phone at 413-545-5738, or by email at ccrago@resecon.umass.edu.  
 
Review Board approval: The Human Subjects Internal Review Board at the University of Massachusetts has 
approved this study. If you have any concerns about your rights as a participant in this study you may contact the 
Review Board by phone at 413-545-3428, or by email at humansubjects@ora.umass.edu. 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT AND SIGN BELOW IF YOU AGREE1 
Please return this form to the Department of Resource Economics using the stamped envelope provided. Thank you! 
 
I, the signer on the lease, have read the information in this consent form and I agree to participate in the study. 
 
 
__________________________________________                            _______________        
Signature                                                                                                 Date 
 
__________________________________________                            ________________ 
Printed Name                                                                                              Apartment Unit #  
  
____________________________________ 
Email Address (optional) 
 
 
A copy of this consent form will be sent to you by mail or email (if provided). 
                                                 
1 You may also indicate your consent by going to our website: http://bit.do/nvaconsent. 
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APPENDIX C
HIGH- AND LOW-USERS
C.1 Definition
High- and low-users of electricity were defined using the following expression:
high-user if :
∑
xit–x¯t∑
ti
> 0
low-user if :
∑
xit–x¯t∑
ti
≤ 0
∀ti | ti is included in the pre-treatment period
where xit is the hourly electricity consumption measured in kWh at time t for household i;
and where x¯t is the mean hourly electricity consumption measured in kWh at time t for household all households.
(Due to an unequal number of observations per household, ti varies according to household.)
Put more simply, if the household typically consumed above-average during the pre-
treatment period, it was labeled a high-user; if the household typically consumed below-
average during the pre-treatment period, it was labeled a low-user.
69
C.2 Distribution
Table C.1 shows how splitting the sample between high- and low-users affects how
the observations are distributed amongst experimental groups. Overall there are more
households in the low-user group that the high-user group. There are eleven high-users
and nine low-users in the control group; eight high-users and twelve low-users in Treatment
Group 1; and nine high-users and 13 low-users in Treatment Group 2.
Table C.1: Distribution of High- and Low-users of Electricity
Model 6 Model 1c Model 1d
[ALL] [High-Users] [Low-Users]
HH (control) 20 11 9
HH (treat 1) 20 8 12
HH (treat 2) 22 9 13
n (control) 70308 38884 31424
n (treat 1 ) 69566 26338 43228
n (treat 2) 78513 32263 46250
HH 62 28 34
n 218387 97485 120902
Table C.2 presents the summary statistics of hourly electricity consumption measured
in kilo-Watt-hours per hour (kWh/hour). Predictably the mean consumption level is higher
amongst the high-users. High-users also appear to have a higher standard deviation. There
is not much distinction between the maximum and minimum observations, however.
Table C.2: Summary Statistics
High- and Low-Users
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
HIGH-USER: kWh/hour 2.620 1.257 0.010 10.575
LOW-USER: kWh/hour 2.001 1.009 0 9.327
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C.3 Behavioral Differences
Table C.3 compares the parameter estimates resulting from 4.11 when fitted separately
for high- and low-users of electricity23. Notable is the fact that the most prominent differ-
ences are found on the time-of-day fixed-effects variables. This can be explained however
due to the fact that low consumers probably have higher variation in their consumption
throughout the day because it is likely they are at home less frequently. Additionally we
see large differences in the holiday variables. One explanation may be that households with
families that use a high amount of electricity are more likely to stay home during Thanks-
giving and Winter break, whereas low consumers are more likely to leave to be with family
or go on vacation. In contrast, the parameter estimate on the variable indicating Spring
break, is higher amongst the low-users. Following our hypothesis on families, it is not com-
mon for elementary school children to have spring break at the same time as students at
the university. Therefore children are still gone during the day, and they use less electricity.
Less likely to travel over Spring break because of mid-terms, low-users are more likely to
be home and using more electricity.
1lnkWhit =
∑
βrXit + εit
2Standard errors and significance levels are not evaluated in this section. Though the p-values are not
provided here, overall the vast majority of the parameter estimates were found to be significant for both
high- and low-users.
3Some of the parameter estimates cannot be compared (e.g. Block 12i) because there were no observations
from that group with which to form a parameter estimate.
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Table C.3: Comparison of OLS Parameter Estimates
High- and Low-Users
HIGH-USERS LOW-USERS Δ
Block 11i -0.356 0.091 -0.447
Block 13i -0.151 -0.288 0.136
Block 16i -0.052 -0.057 0.004
Block 17i -0.039 -0.030 -0.009
Block 18i -0.105 0.067 -0.172
Block 19i -0.098 -0.102 0.004
Block 21i -0.111 -0.439 0.328
Block 23i -0.057 0.049 -0.106
Block 24i -0.312 -0.220 -0.091
Block 25i -0.224 -0.086 -0.138
Block 26i -0.170 0.069 -0.239
Block 27i -0.016 0.106 -0.122
Block 28i -0.120 -0.007 -0.114
Block 29i -0.163 0.107 -0.270
endi 0.000 -0.039 0.039
tempt -0.021 -0.023 0.002
precipt 0.027 0.027 0.000
TOD 1t -0.035 -0.053 0.018
TOD 2t -0.083 -0.078 -0.005
TOD 3t -0.113 -0.072 -0.041
TOD 4t -0.115 -0.056 -0.058
TOD 5t -0.110 -0.027 -0.084
TOD 6t -0.090 0.011 -0.100
TOD 7t -0.039 0.114 -0.153
TOD 8t 0.047 0.197 -0.150
TOD 9t 0.083 0.157 -0.075
TOD 10t 0.056 0.084 -0.028
TOD 11t 0.013 0.033 -0.020
TOD 12t 0.035 0.028 0.007
TOD 13t -0.021 -0.015 -0.006
TOD 14t -0.123 -0.067 -0.056
TOD 15t -0.164 -0.092 -0.072
TOD 16t -0.143 -0.080 -0.063
TOD 17t -0.064 -0.016 -0.048
TOD 18t 0.026 0.055 -0.029
TOD 19t 0.072 0.095 -0.023
TOD 20t 0.076 0.105 -0.029
TOD 21t 0.074 0.088 -0.014
TOD 22t 0.066 0.076 -0.010
TOD 23t 0.046 0.049 -0.002
Tuet -0.056 -0.050 -0.006
Wedt -0.019 -0.010 -0.009
Thut 0.012 0.006 0.006
Frit -0.027 -0.038 0.011
Satt 0.013 -0.032 0.045
Sunt 0.032 0.008 0.023
HolidayMt -0.067 -0.061 -0.007
Thankst 0.045 -0.030 0.076
Wintert 0.044 -0.006 0.050
Springt -0.102 0.090 -0.192
Snowt 0.088 0.066 0.022
n 97485 120902 -23417
adj R2 0.214 0.238
See Table 4.6 for description of variable groups. Parameter differences equal to or
greater than 0.05 are highlighted in bold.
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